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by 
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ABSTRACT 
Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 provides that 
housing is a basic human right and that the government must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures to achieve the realisation of this right. A number 
of measures were taken to try to resolve this socio-economic issue. A number of 
housing institutions were established , various pieces of legislation were passed 
and housing subsidies were provided. However, housing backlogs remain a 
challenge. In March 1994 the housing backlog was estimated between 1,3 and 
1,8 million units. When more than a million houses were provided by 2001 , the 
housing backlog had increased to between 2 and 3 million houses. To date 
subsidies in excess of R29 billion have been spent on housing provision. A study 
by the Department of Housing concluded that, at the current rate of increase of 
housing funding vis-a-vis the growing backlog and rapid urbanisation , the 
household backlog will not be changed in ten years' time. 
The United States of America (USA) had a similar low cost housing problem, but 
securitisation alleviated it with the participation of government agencies Fannie 
Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. In South Africa, the NHFC tried to emulate 
the USA model by establishing Gateway Home Loans (Pty) Limited (Gateway) in 
1999. Gateway, however, was not a success. This research investigates whether 
securitisation can be applied in South Africa to alleviate the low cost housing 
issue. 
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The study finds that there is a credit availability gap for the low income sector 
earning less than R8 000 per month because of the perceived risk of default and 
unwillingness by banks to lend to this sector. The increase in housing backlog 
that continues unabated , inadequate housing finance system to low income 
earners, the lessons learnt from the failure of Gateway, the success factors of the 
USA securitisation model and the sound and sophisticated South African 
financial system are the rationale for applying securitisation. A proposal of how to 
effectively apply securitisation to low cost housing in South Africa is provided with 
recommendations to revive the primary market. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is organised into five chapters. Chapter one is an introductory 
chapter. It provides the context, objectives, key assumptions and limitations of 
the thesis. This chapter ends with a brief description of the subsequent chapters. 
1.2. CONTEXT OF THE THESIS 
Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
provides that housing is a basic human right and that the government must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to 
achieve the progressive realisation of th is right. In an attempt to eradicate or 
reduce the housing backlog, the government formulated and implemented a 
housing policy. A number of measures were taken to try to resolve this socio-
economic issue. The measures include the establishment of a number of housing 
institutions, passing various pieces of legislation and the provision of housing 
subsidies. 
The housing finance institutions established include the Home Loan Guarantee 
Company (HLGC) established in 1990, the Community Bank in 1994, the 
National Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency (NURCHA) in May 1995, 
the Mortgage Indemnity Fund (MIF) and Servcon Housing Solutions (SHS) in 
June 1995 and the National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) in 1996. 
These institutions were set up with different mandates. 
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According to SA Financial Sector Forum (2003: 2), "the main purpose of the 
HLGC is the facilitation of access to finance for low income housing by providing 
guarantees of last resort for mortgage-backed and non-mortgage-backed finance 
and providing, mobilising and managing mortgage insurance." 
The Community Bank was established to address the savings and borrowing 
needs of low income individuals. NURCHA offers guarantees to financial 
institutions that provide bridging finance for housing projects and to those that 
extend credit to small housing loans. According to NURCHA (2003: 1), it was 
"established to facilitate finance for low income housing projects focusing on 
households with an income of below R1 500 per month. " 
The MIF was established as a wholly government-owned company to provide 
cover to banks in the event of default. According to SA Financial Sector Forum 
(2003: 1), "the expectation was that it would unlock significant mortgage lending 
for the low income market in areas where the banks were refusing to lend." The 
SHS was established as a joint venture between the government and several 
banks. Its main purpose was to deal with the properties that had been 
repossessed in certain areas where the banks were unable to physically 
repossess. 
NHFC (2003: 1) states that the NHFC was established by government to create 
"housing opportunities for the low and moderate income families by funding 
intermediaries like retail lenders, small banks, niche and micro lenders." These 
would provide finance to households with monthly incomes between R1 000 and 
R6 000 for home improvement, ownership and rental housing . All the above-
mentioned institutions were established to alleviate the housing finance problem. 
The government also took legislative measures in an attempt to address this 
socio-economic issue. In 2002 the Community Reinvestment Bill (2002) was 
tabled in parliament. The bill is still under discussion by the banking sector, the 
11 
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government and other stakeholders. The bill aims at discouraging financial 
institutions from refusing loans to the low income housing market. It calls for 
penalties of up to R500 000 for financial institutions that discriminate against low 
income earners. Another piece of legislation, the Home Loan Disclosure Act 
(2000) , requires banks to disclose information relating to their home loans 
applications. 
The other notable measure that the government implemented in 1994 is the 
provision of housing subsidies to all households earning not more than R3 500 
per month. To date the government has spent in excess of R29 billion on housing 
provision (Sisulu, 2005b: 3) . 
Despite taking the above mentioned measures, housing provision remains a 
challenge. In March 1994 it was estimated that the housing backlog was between 
1,3 and 1,8 million units (Stratoudakis, 1994: 16). By July 2001 1,1 million 
houses were built. However, the housing backlog had increased to between 2 
and 3 million houses translating to approximately 7,5 million people without 
adequate housing (Knight, 2001: 1). A study by the Department of Housing 
concluded that, at the current increase in housing funding vis-a-vis the growing 
backlog and rapid urbanisation, the household backlog will not be changed in ten 
years' time (Sisulu, 2005b: 4). 
In the early 1930s, the United States of America (USA) had a similar low cost 
housing problem, but securitisation alleviated it with the participation of 
government agencies Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). The NHFC tried to emulate the USA 
model of utilising securitisation to fund low cost housing by establishing Gateway 
Home Loans (Pty) Limited (Gateway) in 1999. Gateway was created to promote 
the secondary mortgage market. It bought mortgage loans from originators and 
issued securities in the capital market to fund the purchase of the loans. The 
12 
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Gateway initiative was discontinued in 2001 . The only attempt thus far to use 
securitisation to fund low cost housing in South Africa had failed. 
It may be argued that the South African housing market resembles the USA 
housing market after the Great Depression (Roberts, 1999: 16). It is notable that 
the involvement of the USA government in the secondary mortgage market 
resolved the housing problem (an issue that we will return to later). The same 
concept has been successfully applied in other countries like Malaysia and 
Australia. As noted, in South Africa Gateway was not a success. This research 
attempts to facilitate the understanding of mortgage securitisation and to 
investigate whether there is a case for applying securitisation to low cost housing 
finance in South Africa. 
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
• To provide a general overview of mortgage securitisation in order to 
facilitate understanding of this potentially important low cost housing 
funding tool. 
• To identify the success factors of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in the USA and the failure factors of Gateway in South Africa. 
• To investigate whether there is a case for applying securitisation to low 
cost housing finance in South Africa. 
1.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is limited to identifying the success factors of only the USA 
securitisation model , although this has been successfully applied in other 
countries. It is also limited to investigating whether there is a case for applying 
13 
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traditional securitisation, although various types such as synthetic and whole 
business securitisations have evolved . 
1,5. CONTENTS OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
Chapter two provides a general theoretical overview of securitisation. The key 
aspects as well as the accounting issues, taxation, legal issues and regulatory 
environment of securitisation are discussed. An overview of the South African 
securitisation market is presented. This chapter ends with a discussion of the 
benefits and concerns about securitisation. 
Chapter three reviews the literature on residential mortgage-backed 
securitisation (RMBS). A brief history of RMBS and an overview of the USA 
RMBS market are discussed. The involvement, operations and success factors 
of the government agencies, Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
highlighted. An overview of the South African RMBS market is presented. The 
operations of Gateway and its failure factors are also discussed. This chapter 
ends with a discussion on the risks involved in RMBS transactions and ways to 
eliminate or mitigate them. 
Chapter four presents a discussion on housing finance in South Africa. The 
measures taken by the South African Government to address low income 
housing finance are highlighted. The rationale to apply securitisation to low 
income housing finance in South Africa is presented. The chapter ends with a 
proposal of how to effectively apply securitisation to low income housing finance 
in South Africa. 
Chapter five summarises the conclusions of all chapters, and recommendations 
for further research are presented. 
14 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SECURITISATION: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a general theoretical overview of securitisation. However, 
to give context to this financial innovation a brief introduction to the financial 
system is provided. 
"A financial system may be defined as a set of arrangements embracing the 
lending and borrowing of funds by non-financial economic units and the 
intermediation of this function by financial institutions in order to facilitate the 
transfer of funds, to create additional money when required, and to create 
markets in debt instruments so that the price and allocation of funds are 
determined efficiently," (Faure, 2002b: 8). The financial system is about the 
deficit economic units borrowing from surplus economic units. This can be done 
directly, or via financial intermediaries. In direct financing the ultimate borrowers 
purchase primary securities issued by lenders directly with the interposition of a 
broker. As cited by Faure (2002b, 8) this "can only take place to the extent that 
the lenders' requirements in terms of size, risk, return and term to maturity can 
be matched with the requirements of the borrowers." Financial intermediaries 
assist in resolving to meet the requirements of both lenders and borrowers by 
purchasing securities of borrowers and issuing their own (called indirect 
securities) to lenders for a fee. When new securities (including both primary and 
indirect securities) are issued, this market is referred to as the primary market. 
When the previously issued securities are traded, that market is referred to as 
the secondary market. 
15 
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Financial intermediaries facilitate the flow of funds between the surplus and 
deficit units of these categories. Securitisation vehicles are not ongoing lenders 
and borrowers, and may be regarded as quasi-financial intermediaries as they 
intermediate on a once-off basis. A securitisation vehicle may hold a portfolio of 
mortgages which is financed by the issue of mortgage backed securities. 
Securitisation has been defined in many ways by different professionals and 
practitioners. Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 3) define securitisation as "the 
general phenomenon whereby more fund raising is occurring through the agency 
of securities. Credit securitisation, as a subset of securitisation, is the carefully 
structured process whereby loans and other receivables are packaged, 
underwritten and sold in the form of securities (instruments commonly known as 
asset-backed securities or ABSs) ." According to Faure (2002a: 105), "traditional 
securitisation amounts to the pooling of certain non-marketable assets that have 
a regular cash flow, in a legal vehicle created for this purpose (called a special 
purpose vehicle or SPV), and the issuing by the SPV of marketable securities to 
finance the pool of assets. The regular cash flow generated by the assets in the 
SPV is used to service the interest payable on the securities issued by the SPV." 
Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 40) point out that securitisation was applied for 
the first time to non-mortgage assets in 1985. Kothari (2003a: 1) cites that "later 
innovation has extended application of securitisation to cover non-financial 
assets such as aircrafts, buildings and even risk such as insurance risk and 
weather risk. " The traditional boundaries of securitisation were stretched and 
various types of securitisation evolved. The notable types are whole business 
securitisation and synthetic securitisation which are briefly discussed below. 
Some companies have successfully securitised the cash flows of an entire 
business unit instead of just a specific pool of assets. According to Harris 
(2003: 1) th is is called whole business securitisation and "is particularly attractive 
16 
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for a business that has significant value attached to assets it is unable to reflect 
on its balance sheet such as brands or other intellectual property rights. Whole 
business securitisation differs from the traditional form in that there is no sale of 
the assets to be securitised, but instead a secure loan structure and that the SPV 
will be a member of the borrowing company's corporate group." As discussed 
later in this chapter, one of the motivations for securitisation by originators is to 
remove assets from their balance sheets. From the above-mentioned definition of 
whole business securitisation, this benefit is not realised because of accounting 
consolidation. 
The South African regulations make a distinction between traditional 
securitisation and synthetic securitisation . Securitisation Notice (2004: 17) 
defines a traditional securitisation scheme as one that "involves the legal and 
economic transfer of assets to an SPV that issues commercial paper that claims 
against the said assets transferred. Different classes of commercial paper are 
normally issued, and each class has a different priority claim on the cash flows 
originating from the underlying pool of assets." In synthetic securitisation 
transactions banks use credit derivatives to transfer the credit risk of a specified 
pool of assets to third parties. Securitisation Notice (2004: 25) defines a synthetic 
securitisation scheme as one that "refers to a transaction whereby an institution 
uses a credit-derivative instrument to transfer the risk associated with a specified 
pool of assets to a special purpose institution. Normally, the resulting credit 
exposures have different levels of seniority." 
Securitisation transactions are structured differently depending on the motivation. 
The following section discusses securitisation structures. Generally, 
securitisation structuring ensures that the bankruptcy of the originator will not 
affect the SPV. 
17 
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2.2. SECURITISATION STRUCTURES 
2.2.1. Introduction 
As cited by Hamilton (2003: 1), it would be impractical to try to cover all 
securitisation structures, but the two generic "classic" securitisation structures are 
term structures and conduit structures. These are discussed in the next sections. 
2.2.2. Term structure 
2.2.2.1. Introduction 
This is the most common securitisation structure. The key aspects of the term 
structure are briefly discussed in Figure 1.1 below. Reference is made to how the 
South African regulation on securitisation deals with the key aspects of these 
structures. Accounting , tax and legal issues are also covered . 
2.2.2.2. Originator 
In a securitisation transaction the originator is the seller of assets from its 
balance sheet to the SPV. Originators normally create assets by providing goods 
and services to their customers (the obligors in Figure 1.1) and in turn receive 
payment for doing so. 
South African regulation for financial institutions makes a distinction between an 
originator, a remote originator, a repackager and a sponsor. According to the 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 9), "a remote originator means an institution that 
directly or indirectly lends money to the SPV in order for the SPV to take transfer 
of assets in terms of a traditional securitisation scheme, or risk in terms of a 
synthetic securitisation scheme. A repackager means an institution that transfers 
assets, or risk relating to assets consisting of national Government securities or 
18 
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FIGURE 1.1: KEY ASPECTS OF A SECURITISATION TERM STRUCTURE 
Assets Obligors I 
l Originator Cash 
Rating agencies J II Servicer I Assets Cash 
Agree~ Agreement 
SPV ~ement 
Securities Cash Credit and liquidity 
support 
Investors 
Adapted from Hamilton, 2003: 4. 
qualifying items of third parties via its balance sheet in terms of a securitisation 
scheme." A sponsor transfers assets indirectly, that is, not from its balance sheet 
to the SPV as an arranger or a structurer or both (Securitisation Notice, 
2004: 11). 
Securitisation involves the creation of a security based on the underlying assets 
placed in an SPV by the originator so that the security is not a claim against the 
originator, but a claim against such assets. In the United States of America 
(USA) a number of measures are taken to protect investors of ABSs in the event 
of bankruptcy of the originator. Three measures, highlighted by Rosenthal and 
Ocampo (1988: 43), are that "firstly, the transfer of the assets from the originator 
19 
, . 
, , 
. , 
to the SPV must qualify as a true sale rather than a pledge. Secondly, the SPV 
that purchases the receivables must perfect its right to the receivables in 
accordance with the applicable state law. Perfection means that the appropriate 
documents must be filed and the receivables properly marked as required by the 
uniform commercial code, in order to legally validate the claim to the receivables. 
Thirdly, the SPV's business must be restricted to the purchase of the assets and 
the issuance of ABSs." 
Kothari (2003c: 2) suggests that the transfer of assets could be by novation, 
participation or assignment. Novation is alteration in the terms of the original 
contract with the obligor. Participation is the creation of a right in favour of the 
transferee in the proceeds of the asset. Assignment is full legal transfer. 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 14) defines transfer by virtue of a sale "or such other 
method of transfer as may be approved by the Registrar." This transfer shall 
divest the originator of all rights and obligations regarding the assets transferred. 
The SPV shall have no right of recourse against the originator regarding costs 
incurred in connection with the assets transferred. 
True sale is required in securitisation, otherwise the transaction becomes 
collaterised lending. Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 43) cite that in the USA 
securitisation market, true sale is fulfilled when "the transfer of the assets is 
accounted for, as a sale on the originator's financial statements. Recourse to the 
originator should not be for an amount much greater than the reasonably 
anticipated losses on the assets based primarily on historic performance of 
similar assets." 
According to Kothari (2003e: 1), "the requirements for true sale may be laid down 
by the law of the land or by the courts or be implied from judicial history or legal 
tradition or be inferred from international practice of securitisation industry." 
20 
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In South Africa, the Securitisation Notice (2004: 18) provides that "a true sale is 
likely to occur when the conditions relating to limiting of association as set out 
below are met: 
• when the transfer of assets divests the originator of all rights and 
obligations originating from the underlying transactions and all risks in 
connection with the assets; 
• the SPV shall have no right of recourse against the originator with respect 
to financial obligations incurred as a result of the transferred assets; 
• repurchase can only be done as an independent activity from transfer with 
no prior obligation to do so." 
Accounting is a crucial issue in securitisation, as one of the motivations is to take 
assets off the balance sheet. The South African accounting statements and the 
securitisation regulations provide guidelines on this issue. SAICA's accounting 
statement AC133 (2002b) states that an originator can only remove the assets 
from its balance sheet if it "loses control of the contractual rights over the asset 
that comprises the financial asset. An enterprise loses such control if it realises 
the rights to benefits specified in the contract, the rights expire, or the enterprise 
surrenders those rights." Control is not lost if the transferor has the right to 
reacquire the assets or the transferor has retained substantially all the risks and 
rewards of ownership. Control is also not lost if the asset is not readily obtainable 
in the market or if the transferee does not have the ability to obtain the benefits of 
the assets. 
SAICA's accounting statement AC412 (2002b) requires the consolidation of an 
SPV if the originator maintains any beneficial interest in the SPV, even though it 
may own little or none of the SPV's equity. According to SAICA's accounting 
statement AC412 (2002b), "a beneficial interest in an SPV may, for example, 
take the form of a debt instrument, an equity instrument, a participation right, a 
residual interest or a lease. This ensures accounting consolidation of a 
21 
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securitisation vehicle if the originator maintains any interest in the SPY or 
provides cred it enhancement in the form of a subordinated loan." 
SAICA's accounting statement AC412 (2002b) requires consolidation of the SPY 
when the substance of the relationship between the originator and the SPY 
indicates that the originator controls the SPY. Control may arise through a 
number of ways. It may be through the predetermination of the activities of the 
SPY (operating on autopilot) or through the activities being conducted on behalf 
of the originator so that the originator benefits from the SPY's operation or when 
the originator has decision-making powers. The statement envisages a situation 
where the operations of an Spy are solely for the benefit of the originator. 
Accounting consolidation is required in this case even if the originator has no 
beneficial interest in the SPY. A situation could therefore well occur where 
accounting consolidation becomes necessary, but the requirement for the 
originating bank to include the assets and liabilities of the SPY in its reporting 
forms to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) does not occur. 
Kothari (2003d: 3) cites that "the basic determinant of removal of asset 
accounting is the transfer of control. " This perspective is reflected in the South 
African accounting guidelines. 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 38) provides that an originator may account for the 
difference between the book value and the price below book value at which the 
assets were transferred to the SPY as a loss in its income statement. If this is not 
done it requires that the difference in prices should be regarded as a first-loss 
credit-enhancement facility which shall , for the purpose of calculating a bank's 
prescribed capital requirement, be treated as an impairment against the bank's 
primary capital and reserve funds. 
22 
, . 
, , 
, . 
r ' 
•• 
2.2.2.3. Special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
This is an entity whose sole purpose is to acquire the assets from the originator, 
and funds this by issuing securities, backed by the underlying assets, to 
investors. SPVs can take the form of corporations, companies or trusts 
depending on the applicable accounting and legal regulations. SPVs in the USA 
usually take the form of trusts to take advantage of the tax benefits. 
The SPV is generally required to be independent of the originator. This structure 
achieves two significant aims of securitisation. The sale of assets to the SPV by 
the originator removes the assets from the originator's balance sheet. Secondly 
the bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV protects the investors from the credit risk 
of everything other than the assets themselves. 
In the South African financial markets, an SPV may be classified as a quasi-
financial intermediary. Faure (2000: 7) adds that "this vehicle may hold a portfolio 
of mortgages financed by the issue of MBSs. In so doing it is intermediating, but 
on a once-off basis." 
The Securitisation Notice (2004: 22) requires that an originator may not: 
• acquire or hold 20 per cent nominal value of the issued equity share 
capital in the SPV; 
• have the right to determine the result of the voting at the SPV's general 
meeting; 
• directly or ind irectly hold more than 20 per cent of the beneficial interest 
or be a beneficiary of the SPV; 
• exercise control over or manage the SPV. 
• The board of directors of the SPV shall be independent of the originator. 
The originator may, however, appoint one director or one trustee to the 
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not less than three members. 
• The name of the SPY shall not include the name of the originator or imply 
any association with such an originator. 
Since SPVs (issuers of ABSs) are created as legal entities they are subject to 
applicable corporate or income taxes. The tax perspectives in securitisation 
markets of the USA and South Africa are discussed below. 
According to Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 48), "in the USA there are generally 
three types of issuers of ABSs to consider from a tax perspective: 
• grantor trusts that typically issue pass through certificates; 
• issuers of debt securities typically termed pay-through securities; 
• real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICS)." 
A grantor trust is a fixed investment trust created by a contract called a trust 
agreement or a pooling and servicing agreement. A grantor trust is not subject to 
tax. Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 51) state that, "grantor trusts function as non-
taxable conduits so long as two conditions are met. Firstly the trustee does not 
have the power to purchase new assets or substitute assets (except for 
substituting new receivables for defective receivables during an initial period) or 
any other power to reinvest money in the trust. Secondly, with limited exceptions, 
the trust has only a single class of pass-through certificates. " 
Issuers of pay through certificates can be corporations or owner trusts. The 
ABSs, issued by a corporation, have to qualify as debt securities so that interest 
received by the SPV is tax deductible. According to Rosenthal and Ocampo 
(1988: 56) , certain features have to be incorporated into limited purpose issuers. 
They must contain some additional real layer of equity to distinguish the ABSs 
from equity securities . Structurers create economic differences between the 
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receivables' collateral and the investors' debt securities . Such differences may 
include payment frequencies on the debt securities that differ from those of the 
receivables, over collateralisation of the debt securities, optional call provisions 
on the debt securities and maturity and interest schedules on the debt securities 
that differ from those of the receivables. 
Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 58) define an owner trust as "a business 
established when the originator (often called the depositor) contributes assets to 
a trust by entering into a deposit trust agreement with a trustee." The owner trust 
as the SPV issuing ABSs is not subject to tax. As a result double taxation at the 
SPV level and when the owners receive the proceeds is avoided. 
Real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICS) is a tax classification which 
was created by the USA government in 1987 to benefit issuers of MBSs. The 
issuer of MBSs can be any form, corporation or trust and can issue multi class 
and multiple maturity securities without any taxation at the REMICS leve/. 
There are no specific guidelines in South Africa regarding the tax treatment of 
securitisation assets and income flows. The taxation framework in South Africa 
may be looked at from the point of view of the Income Tax Act (1962) , the Value 
Added Tax Act (1991) and the Un certificated Securities Tax Act (1998). 
Income tax is governed by the Income Tax Act (1962). The SPVs are regarded 
as pass through vehicles . SPVs that are companies are taxed on interest 
received , less interest paid and less deductible costs like fees and expenses. 
Reinvestment income is taxable within the SPV. 
The application of the Value Added Tax Act (1991) comes from the nature of tax 
treatment regarding the income flows that support the securitisation transaction. 
When securitising bank loans, VAT on the income flows is not important; 
however with securitising income flows which will only come into existence in the 
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future, such as a rental stream or a trade receivable, the VAT attached needs to 
be considered with regard to the correct treatment subsequent to the conduct of 
the securitisation. 
The Capital Gains Tax (CGT) principles that apply to companies also apply to 
securitisation transactions , but usually there are no CGT implications as the 
assets held by the SPV are of revenue nature. The legal document by which the 
transfer of assets from the originator is effected is regarded in law as conveyance 
and is liable for a stamp duty. Stamp duty is a tax on the instrument, not the 
transaction. The Uncertificated Securities Tax Act (1998) provides for sUbstantial 
cost savings available to the SPV regarding the issuing of ABSs in that no stamp 
duty is payable by an issuer where the ABSs are listed and immobilised. Van Zyl 
(2003: 270) adds that "the government further enhanced the development of the 
South African corporate bond market by abolishing the stamp duty on listed 
instruments from the 1st of April 2002." 
In securitisation transactions, Kothari (2003f: 3) argues that, "a pass through 
certificate is pro-rated interest in receivables held by the SPV in trust. Hence 
transfer of pass through certificates is only a transfer of beneficial interest and 
not of assets as the SPV continues to hold the receivables. Therefore, there is 
no duty applicable on transfer of pass through certificates." 
2.2.2.4. Servicer 
Servicing of the SPV includes administration of the underlying assets, receiving 
all related cash flows on behalf of the SPV, managing the relationship between 
the SPV and borrowers and administering the priority of payments. The other 
duties include providing cash management services to the SPV, maintaining and 
making claims under the insurance contracts, managing the computer and 
information systems of the issuer and providing general company secretarial and 
administrative service to the SPV. 
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The originator is usually the servicer and the SPV pays a service fee for it. This is 
because the originator normally has the necessary systems and records and it 
usually wishes to preserve its customer relationships. In this way the originator 
earns money, while having transferred the credit risk to investors. There will 
normally be a replacement administrator should the servicer fail to adequately 
perform this function . 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 48) requires that a bank or any other institution 
within a banking group may act as a servicer provided that, among other things, 
there is a formal servicing agreement in place. This agreement has to specify the 
services to be provided and the standard for the performance of these services. 
2.2.2.5. Rating 
A rating by a rating agency adds value to securitisation transactions in that it 
measures payment ability under different macro-economic scenarios and 
different default stress levels. Rating is both initial and periodical. According to 
Rees (2002: 17), the issues that rating agencies review include bankruptcy 
remoteness of the SPV from the originator, credit enhancement required, risk of 
the SPV bankruptcy because of other liabilities, audit on the quality of 
receivables and systems of the administrator. 
Faure (2002b: 66) also notes that the rating agencies "collect and analyse all 
available accounting, other financial and subjective information in order to arrive 
at a rating that reflects the issuer's ability to pay the interest and repay the 
principal of the debt. They endeavour to arrive at a probability of default. They 
make use of complex financial ratio analysis, industry analysis and economic 
analysis." 
A good understanding of applicable rating criteria allows for optimised transaction 
structuring. The benefit of an acceptable rating increases the chances of placing 
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paper. A rating on its own, however, should not be an investment decision in 
itself. 
The credit rating of ASSs issued by the SPV can be higher than the originator's 
general credit rating because of credit enhancement. Rating agencies do not rate 
the traditional collaterised bond much higher than the overall corporate rating of 
the issuing company. This is because bankruptcy of the issuer will cause default 
on the timely payment of interest and principal. There are a number of rating 
agencies, but the three principal ones are Standard & Poor's (S & P), Moody's 
and Fitch ISeA. Table 2.1 below shows the ratings of Moody's and S & P. 
Rating agencies seek to ensure that their rating is internationally consistent, for 
example a USA AAA rating is the same as the English AAA rating . The best 
quality AAA rating is rewarded with a keen rate in the market. 
In mature securitisation markets like the USA, the rating is required as a 
condition of portfolio mandates. The rating is also accepted as a true reflection of 
the quality of a securitisation issue. According to Jacobs and Fergus (2003: 3), 
"this is not currently the case in the South African market. Ratings provided by 
local rating agencies have not yet achieved the status of acceptability that 
investors feel allows for a level of confidence in the paper based on the rating. 
There is little rate differentiation between an AAA rating and an AA rating." 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 6) defines a domestic rating as "a rating that is tiered 
against an assumed best possible rating, which is usually that of the national 
Government, and which rating does not incorporate the sovereign risks of South 
Africa and which gives an indication of the relative risks only within the Republic 
of South Africa and which is not comparable across different countries." 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 5) also defines a credit rating as "a domestic rating 
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TABLE 2.1: MOODY'S AND STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS AND 
SUCCINCT EXPLANATIONS 
Rating explanation 
Best quality, smallest degree of risk 
High quality, slightly more long-term risk than top 
rating 
Upper medium grade, possible impairment in the 
future 
Medium grade, lack outstanding investment 
characteristics 
Speculative issues; protection may be moderate 
Very speculative ; small likelihood of interest and 
principal payments. 
Issues in poor standing; may be in default 
Speculative in a high degree, with marked 
shortcomings 
Lowest quality; poor prospects of attaining real 
investment 
Adapted from Faure, 2002b: 66. 
Moody's 
rating 
Aaa 
Aal 
Aa2 
S & P's 
rating 
AAA 
AA+ 
AA 
Aa3 AA-
A1 
A2 
A+ 
A 
A3 A-
Baa1 
Baa2 
Baa3 
Ba1 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB-
BB+ 
Ba2 BB 
Ba3 BB-
B1 
B2 
B3 
Caa 
Ca 
C 
B+ 
B 
B-
CCC 
CC 
C 
assigned by a credit-rating agency to commercial paper issued in respect of a 
traditional or a synthetic securitisation scheme." 
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2.2.2.6. Trustees 
A trust enhances the independence of the SPV and provides added security for 
the investors. The body of trustees holds the securities in favour of the investors. 
The trustees ensure quality controls and monitor the SPV on an ongoing basis. 
They also ensure that measures normally put in place by rating agencies to 
protect investors are maintained. The body of trustees has the power to close 
the SPV down in circumstances deemed appropriate. 
The trustees also monitor the work of the servicer, especially the monthly cash 
flows, to ensure that the investors receive payments they are entitled to. In the 
event that the servicer does not honour its obligation of collecting receivables or 
paying proceeds to investors, the trustees would take appropriate corrective legal 
action on behalf of the investors. 
2.2.2.7. Credit enhancement 
Credit enhancement in securitisation transactions aims at protecting investors 
against losses arising from the non-performance of the assets securitised. It also 
ensures that the risk of default is minimised and that appropriate rating is 
achieved by the SPV. The types and amounts of enhancement are dictated by 
the quality of the underlying assets and the nature of the security issued. 
Originators normally provide some credit enhancement in securitisation 
transactions. According to Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 66) , "a sound and 
economic credit securitisation system usually requires some credit support by the 
originator. The retention of credit risk by the originator will help to ensure that the 
originator retains an incentive to continue to originate quality assets rather than 
sticking investors and third-party credit enhancers with uneconomic assets." 
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Credit enhancement can be internal or external. Internal cred it enhancement can 
be achieved using a cash reserve account, over collateral isation of underlying 
assets and structural credit enhancement. Any surplus or difference between the 
interest on the securities and interest on the receivables is kept in the cash 
reserve account. The over collateralisation of underlying assets sold to the Spy 
is in relation to the amount of debt offered to investors. This can be expensive, 
as the tied up collateral cannot be used for other purposes. Structural credit 
enhancement is a technique of credit enhancement whereby different classes of 
debt instruments are created with varying levels of default risk. 
External credit enhancement is also referred to as third party credit 
enhancement. It includes provision of a subordinated loan, guarantees by 
insurance companies and letters of credit (LOC). Gangwani (1998: 26) points out 
that external credit enhancement was mainly used in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, but this has declined over time in favour of internal credit enhancement. 
This is because of the inherent risk of reliance on the credit rating (subject to 
possible down grades over time) of the third party. This is reiterated by Obay 
(2000: 84) who cites that in the event of having a third party as a credit enhancer, 
there is always the risk of a downgrade in the security's rating if the credit 
enhancer's rating is lowered. The development of a senior or subordinated 
enhancement structure alleviates this risk and enhances the credit rating of the 
senior securities. 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 35) highlights that "credit-enhancement facilities can 
be provided on a transaction-specific or a programme-wide basis. Transaction-
specific credit enhancement serves as the first layer of loss protection and 
addresses the unique characteristics and credit risk of the underlying or 
referencing asset. A programme-wide facility serves as a second layer of loss 
protection , absorbing losses in excess of the transaction-specific enhancement, 
which losses are typically due to the size and composition of the credit portfolio." 
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For a bank or any institution within a banking group in South Africa, there is a 
distinction in the regulations between a first loss credit enhancement facility and 
a second loss credit enhancement facility. The first loss credit enhancement 
facility is a credit enhancement facility that represents the first level of credit 
enhancement to parties involved in a securitisation scheme. The second loss 
credit enhancement facility is a credit enhancement facility that may only be 
drawn after the first loss credit enhancement facility has been exhausted. 
In the USA, the Federal Government provided most of the credit enhancement 
that supported conforming residential mortgage securitisation, but not for non-
residential mortgages and non-conforming mortgages. Conforming mortgages 
are the ones that meet the eligibility criteria established by the agencies (Fannie 
Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac) for being in a pool of mortgages underlying a 
security that they guarantee. Non-conforming mortgages are the ones that do not 
meet the criteria. The operations of these USA government agencies will be 
covered in more detail in the next chapter. 
2.2.2.8. Liquidity support 
Liquidity is generally needed to mitigate the risks of servicer disruption or 
insufficient funds in the event of high arrears and to ensure the issuer's credit 
refund obligation. The issuer needs to have the funds to advance credit refunds. 
In the event that the issuer does not receive sufficient principal and does not 
have enough excess spread or funds in the reserve fund, the liquidity facility can 
be used to temporarily fund the credit refunds. 
Liquidity ensures that the SPV will always be able to meet the timely payment of 
its obligations. Financial institutions that are able to provide these liquidity 
facilities mostly sponsor this. The institution giving liquidity support provides 
short-term finance if receivables are not received on time or if there are market 
disruptions. It may do so through a guaranteed investment contract (GIC) 
(Duggan, 2003: 1). GIC guarantees a reinvestment rate on all cash flows 
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received prior to its scheduled payment date. This way prepayment uncertainty 
is eliminated, creating an investment opportunity . 
Securitisation Notice (2004: 39) requires that the liquidity facility should be 
documented with all reference terms and it may not be used as a permanent 
revolving facility to cover any losses incurred. If a bank does not comply with the 
liquidity support conditions set out, the liquidity facility concerned shall be 
regarded as a first-loss credit-enhancement facility. 
2.2.3. Conduit structure 
The conduit structure is generally the same as the term structure. A pool of 
assets, which may be taken from more than one originator, is sold to a 
bankruptcy remote SPV. Hamilton (2003: 4) notes that "in conduit structured 
transactions, credit enhancement is often provided by over collateralisation. In 
large conduit transactions additional credit enhancement may be provided in the 
form of a letter of credit. As a result, one of the most common asset types to be 
funded by conduits is corporate trade receivables." In the conduit structure, the 
securities issued by the SPV are commercial paper notes which are short term in 
nature. 
2.3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITISATION MARKET IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
According to Kothari (2003h: 5), securitisation is a relatively new development in 
South Africa, but its history dates back to 1989 when the first securitisation issue 
was a R250 million mortgage-backed issue by the then Allied Building Society. 
The securitisation market is in its growth stage. Even though some aspects of the 
securitisation market like acceptance of ratings still have a long way to go 
compared with mature markets, certain areas like the regulatory framework have 
taken great strides. 
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As noted, Government Notice 26415 (Securitisation Notice, 2004) is the new 
South African securitisation regulation, and it is in line with mature markets' 
regulations. The South African accounting guidelines recognise that the basic 
determinant of removal of asset accounting is the transfer of control. 
Consolidation of the SPV is required if the originator maintains any beneficial 
interest in the SPV even though it may own none of the SPV's equity. There are, 
however, no specific guidelines regarding the tax treatment of securitisation 
transactions. It has also been noted that rating in South Africa has not yet 
achieved the status of acceptability to earn investors' confidence. 
A number of successful securitisations in South Africa have been witnessed and 
according to Faure (2002a: 107) the best examples are Kiwane, FirstRand 2000-
A, RMB COO 1 Limited and SA Home Loans (SAHL). These, except SAHL, are 
briefly discussed below. SAHL will be discussed in the next chapter under the 
South African residential mortgage backed securitisation section. 
The Kiwane transaction was sponsored by Real Africa Durolink and Gensec 
Bank. In this transaction the originators were several banks and other financial 
institutions with investment grade rated debt. The SPV, Kiwane Capital Holdings 
Limited, issued three classes of bonds, namely the senior K001, mezzanine 
K002 and junior K003 (Rees, 2002: 3).The senior bonds were issued to selected 
institutional investors. The Financial Mail (2000: 48) cites that the Kiwane K001 
bond, released in August 2000, was the first publicly listed collaterised debt 
obligation securitisation in South Africa. 
Faure (2000a: 107) cites that FirstRand 2000-A "involved the securitisation of 
FirstRand's international card receivables, funded by AAA-rated notes, and credit 
enhanced by an AAA-rated insurance guarantee. The RMB Collaterised Debt 
Obligations (COO) 1 Limited involved the COO consisting of USA dollar 
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denominated high yield corporate bonds, funded by AAA-rated notes, mezzanine 
notes and subordinated notes." 
2.4. MOTIVATION FOR SECURITISATION 
2.4.1. Borrowers 
Securitisation can provide borrowers with lower-priced source of finance. As 
stated by Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 12), "this benefit is already evident (in 
the USA) in residential mortgages. In the USA home buyers are now paying 
approximately 100 basis points less in interest (as compared to USA treasury 
yields) on fixed-rate mortgages than they were a decade ago when mortgage 
securitisation was much less pervasive." Corporations benefit from securitisation 
when they remove the assets and their supporting debt from their balance 
sheets. They enhance borrowing flexibility because of less debt on their balance 
sheets. 
2.4.2. Originators 
Securitisation provides originators with the opportunity to expand their finance 
sources. Securitisation allows them to access the capital markets, and in may 
cases, with securities that have ratings higher than their overall corporate rating. 
Originators can expand their volume of business without increasing their capital 
base (i.e. retained earnings or new issues) in the same proportion. Securitisation 
helps originators by removing assets an.d their supporting debt from their balance 
sheets. This enables them, as stated by Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 40), "to 
save more equity costs of on-balance sheet financing and eliminate potential 
asset-liability mismatch." 
Securitisation can be used as a balance sheet management tool. This can be 
achieved by offering companies opportunities to tap into a new investor market, 
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increase returns on equity, reduce interest rate risk associated with asset-liability 
mismatch on the part of the origination and manage down credit exposure to their 
repeat customers. 
Securitisation allows a financial institution, or any other company without the 
balance sheet to support an investment grade credit rating, to execute the 
transaction off balance sheet and avoid or reduce capital and liquidity / reserve 
requirements. Institutions can benefit from securitisation by having future cash 
flows upfront, freeing up funds already tied to outstanding loans enabling them to 
meet the demand for new loans. Securitisation also allows institutions to source 
fee income without straining the balance sheet. 
2.4.3. Investors 
Securitisation offers investors alternative investment instruments which is 
attractive in terms of diversification. ABSs protect investors from rating 
downgrades in the event that the originator's credit quality deteriorates. This is 
because the securitisation structuring process ensures that the issuer of ABSs, 
the SPV, is bankruptcy remote from the originator. Rosenthal and Ocampo 
(1988: 13) add that "as a developmental asset class, ABSs typically provide 
premium yields compared to those of comparable conventional instruments." 
2.5. CONCERNS REGARDING SECURITISATION 
A number of practitioners and academics have raised concerns regarding 
securitisation despite the various motivations and benefits discussed above. 
Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 17) cite that originators may lose their incentive to 
maintain credit discipline since they sell the assets they generate. They further 
add that asset sales may undermine the impact of capital adequacy guidelines 
and other regulatory tools. 
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shareholders. Enron, for example, engaged in the abuse of off-balance-sheet 
SPVs through manipulative accounting transactions. These manipulations 
thrived , as noted by Schwarcz (2002: 4), because of conflict of interest when 
Enron's executives also became principals of the SPVs. 
Hamilton (2003: 6) adds that securitisation "is often time consuming and, while 
credit enhancement structuring can help achieve high ratings, not all pools of 
assets lend themselves to a securitisation solution." 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
Simply put, securitisation means the conversion of existing or future cash inflows 
of any originator into tradable securities which then may be sold in the capital 
market. For financial institutions, it amounts to the selection of certain assets and 
taking them off the balance sheet and freeing up capital. For non-financial 
institutions, it is an alternative to the traditional forms of finance. 
How the securitisation transaction is structured depends on the motivation for 
securitisation. Two structures were discussed, a term structure and a conduit 
structure. As mentioned earlier in this chapter the term structure is the most 
common. The conduit structure is best suited for cash flows that are shorter term 
or revolving in nature. Residential mortgage-backed securitisations (RMBSs) 
utilise term structures. 
As stated by Obay (2000: 9) , the accounting and tax treatment desired by the 
issuer plays an important part on how the securitisation will be structured. These, 
together with the legal aspects and regulatory issues on securitisation, were 
discussed. SPVs in the USA usually take the form of trusts. The main reasons for 
this are the relevant tax implications and that there is no accounting requirement 
to consolidate the assets of the trust with those of the originator. It is worth 
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mentioning that a number of asset securitisation programmes are arranged 
through SPVs established in offshore financial centres that are tax efficient 
jurisdictions such as Jersey, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands or Bermuda. 
Securitisation transactions benefit all parties including the deficit units 
(borrowers), originators and surplus units (investors) . However, concerns with 
securitisation have been raised, one of which led to the collapse of Enron, a 
world class USA corporation. Arguably the benefits of securitisation outweigh the 
concerns especially with respect to RMBS which alleviated the low income 
housing finance issue in the USA. The concerns with securitisation highlight the 
need for a well regulated securitisation environment. It is noted with interest that 
lessons learnt from these isolated cases (especially in mature developed 
securitisation markets) were incorporated in the new South African securitisation 
regulations gazetted on 4 June 2004 (Securitisation, 2004: 1). 
As explained in this chapter, any assets with future cash inflows can be 
securitised. The following chapter deals specifically with securitisation of 
residential mortgages, a concept that alleviated the low cost housing finance 
issue in the USA. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE -BACKED SECURITISATION 
3.1 . INTRODUCTION 
In the traditional approach of mortgage finance a bank lends funds to an 
individual for the purchase of a home. In this way the bank creates a mortgage 
which is a loan with real estate pledged as collateral. This market is referred to 
as the primary mortgage market since new securities are issued. Mortgages are 
generally of small amounts and not marketable. If the bank pools a number of 
mortgages and sells those to a bankrupt remote special purpose vehicle (SPV), 
that market is referred to (in the USA) as the secondary mortgage market since 
previously issued securities are being traded. The SPY funds the purchase of the 
mortgage pool by issuing mortgage-backed securities. This process of 
transmuting mortgages by creating marketable MBSs is residential mortgage-
backed securitisation (RMBS). 
This chapter deals specifically with RMBS. A brief history to RMBS is covered. 
The USA RMBS and the South African RMBS are discussed. The success 
factors of the USA RMBS as well as the failure factors of Gateway Home Loans 
(Gateway), the South African securitisation initiative, are outlined. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the risks in RMBS and ways to mitigate them. 
3.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RMBS 
RMBS originated in the USA. Housing finance problems that began in the 1920s 
led to the introduction of housing reforms by the USA government. The 
culmination of these housing reforms from the 1930s led to the introduction of 
securitisation in the 1960s. 
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In the post World War 1 period , demand for housing grew rapidly. During the pre-
depression era before the 1930s, mortgage finance in the USA required 40 
percent as deposit and had a three to five year term. Mortgagors paid interest 
only during this term and paid a balloon payment of the entire principal as a final 
payment. When the stock market crashed in 1929, there were many defaults on 
mortgages as mortgagors failed to pay the final payment. During the great 
depression the housing finance market suffered considerable damage, as the 
flow of funds into housing was reduced . There was no secondary housing 
finance market. 
The USA government introduced a number of reforms in an attempt to restore 
stability in the housing finance market. According to Sellon and Van Nahmen 
(1988, in Ghersi, 1991 : 184) the four most notable developments that played a 
key role in this evolution were: 
• the establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) and 
the insurance of savings deposits; 
• the adoption of the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage contract; 
• the development of government mortgage insurance; 
• the establishment of Fannie Mae. 
The FHLBS promoted stability by providing liquidity to the savings and loan 
associations that were the primary source of funds to housing. Deposit insurance 
provided stability by reducing the risks of financial loss for depositors in the 
savings and loan associations. The USA government required the housing 
industry to adopt the long term, fixed-rate mortgage contract after problems with 
the balloon mortgage mentioned above. This type of loan was affordable to 
borrowers. In 1934 a piece of housing legislation was enacted to create a 
secondary market in mortgages. The National Housing Act of 1934 provided for 
the establishment of the Federal Housing Agency (FHA) whose principal function 
was to provide insurance of home mortgages made by private lenders. In 1938 
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housing finance by purchasing government-insured loans. 
The credit crisis of 1966 led to the USA government introducing further reforms in 
the period 1968-70. Securitisation was created when Fannie Mae's role was 
changed: it became a private company in 1968 and was authorised to issue 
MBSs by the Charter Act of 1968. Government agencies Ginnie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were established to participate in the secondary mortgage market and 
RMBS market. In 1970 the Emergency Home Finance Act was enacted. That 
piece of legislation authorised Fannie Mae to buy conventional mortgages. These 
reforms brought changes in the mortgage market, and the secondary mortgage 
market became more active. However, that did not solve the housing finance 
problems as the conventional markets were local in scope and there was a lack 
of integration of these markets with national capital markets. Housing finance 
was also periodically affected by high interest rates. The next section discusses 
the USA RMBS market that resolved the housing finance problem. 
3.3. THE USA RMBS MARKET 
3.3.1. Introduction 
The USA secondary mortgage market and the RMBS market are dominated by 
the participation of government agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. Passmore et al. (2001 : 1) cites that the market share of the government 
agencies in the USA RMBS market is "roughly four times the amount securitised 
by the fully private part of the market." Furthermore, the government agencies' 
focus is on the low income housing market, unlike the private issuers of MBSs. 
This section therefore focuses on the government agencies participation in 
RMBS market. In order to give context to the government agencies' securitisation 
processes, a brief background on the primary and secondary mortgage markets 
is provided . 
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The presence of government agencies in the mortgage market in the USA 
effectively classifies mortgages into different segments. A mortgage can be: 
• conventional, 
• conforming, 
• non-conforming or a 
• jumbo mortgage. 
A conventional mortgage is a loan that is not insured or guaranteed by the 
federal government [i.e. by neither the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) nor 
the Veterans' Administration (VA)). A conforming mortgage is "one that meets the 
underwriting standards established by these agencies (Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae 
and Ginnie Mae) for being in a pool of mortgages underlying a security that they 
guarantee" (Fabozzi and Ramsey, 2001: 551). Those loans that do not satisfy the 
set standards are called non-conforming mortgages. Jumbo mortgages are 
mortgages exceeding the maximum loan amount of the conforming mortgages. 
Passmore et al. (2001 : 5) points out that "most private sector securitisations are 
backed by jumbo mortgages." 
The process of originating a conforming mortgage involves a number of stages. 
The borrower submits a loan application to the mortgage originator. The 
mortgage originator then submits the loan application to the guarantor. The 
guarantor guarantees payments in the event that the borrower defaults. There 
are government backed as well as privately owned guarantors. The government 
agencies are the Federal Housing Agency (FHA) and Veterans' Administration 
(VA). FHA insures mortgages for qualified borrowers while VA guarantees 
mortgages for veterans only. Both of these agencies have set standards for 
approving loan applications. The loans have standard terms which include 
maturity, assumability and prepayment. The government backed guarantors have 
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ceilings for the maximum amount of the loan and rigid requirements in approving 
loan applications. 
A loan application that has been accepted by a guarantor is included in a 
mortgage pool. Pool organisers can be private or government agencies. The 
government agencies are Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac whose 
respective participation is discussed in the next section. 
3.3.2. Participation of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Fannie Mae's board of directors, which consists of eight members, determines 
the general policies of the corporation. The President of the USA appoints five of 
these directors and the remainder are elected annually by the shareholders 
(Fannie Mae Charter, 1992: 25). Fannie Mae (2003a: 1) states that currently 
"Fannie Mae operates under a congressional charter and receives no 
government funding. Its mission is to provide products and services that increase 
the availability and the affordability of housing for the low, moderate and middle-
income Americans." Fannie Mae's business falls into three major areas which are 
mortgages pools, MBSs and new investments. These are discussed below. 
Fannie Mae operates only in the secondary mortgage market. It does not lend 
money directly to homebuyers. It buys mortgages from mortgage originators 
which include mortgage companies, savings institutions, credit unions and 
commercial banks. Fannie Mae determines the characteristics of mortgages it 
purchases. However, on conventional mortgages the Fannie Mae Charter (1992: 
5) restricts the types of mortgages they may purchase. The restrictions include 
limiting the loan to value (LTV) ratio to 80 per cent or less and limiting the size of 
the mortgage purchased. 
Fannie Mae purchases more conventional loans than conforming mortgages. It 
only buys those FHA and VA mortgages that are not eligible for other 
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government agency-sponsored mortgage pools. For example, Ginnie Mae buys 
FHA and VA loans that are not more than one year old (Fannie Mae Charter, 
1992: 6) . Fannie Mae either pools these loans to back MBSs or retains the 
mortgages in portfolio. The mortgages that back the Fannie Mae MBS are held in 
a trust which is a legal separate entity. The mortgages are not Fannie Mae 
assets. 
Fannie Mae finances the purchases by issuing debt securities both in the 
domestic market as well as the international market. Fannie Mae (2003b: 1) 
states that its "debt securities are unsecured obligations of the corporation and 
are not backed by the USA government." However, its securities are "exempted 
securities" under the laws administered by the USA Securities and Exchange 
Commission like the USA government obligations. 
"Ginnie Mae was created in 1968 and it operates as a wholly owned government 
agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development." (Ginnie 
Mae, 2003a: 1). Ginnie Mae guaranteed securities backed by FHA and VA loans 
were first issued in 1970. According to Ginnie Mae (2003b: 1), historically 95 per 
cent of all FHA and VA mortgages have been pooled and put through the Ginnie 
Mae securitisation process. Ginnie Mae was initially formed to purchase FHA-
insured or VA-guaranteed loans, but this function is now less important than 
Ginnie Mae's MBS program discussed below. 
Ginnie Mae has two MBSs programs: the Ginnie Mae 1 MBS Program and the 
Ginnie Mae II MBS Program. The Ginnie Mae 1 MBS Program is for the issuance 
of securities backed by either single family or multifamily loans while Ginnie Mae 
II MBS Program is backed by single-family loans only. There are a few other 
differences, but generally the programs have identical features. One notable 
difference is that all securities of Ginnie Mae 1 MBS program must bear an 
adjustable rate of interest (Ginnie Mae, 2003c: 1-2). 
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Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae does not issue MBS or 
purchase mortgage loans, but guarantees MBSs issued by Ginnie Mae approved 
issuers. If an issuer fa ils to make the payment, Ginnie Mae will make the 
payment to the investor. Ginnie Mae (2003b: 1) states that the "Ginnie Mae 
guaranty is backed by the full faith and credit of the USA government." 
The issuer is responsible for servicing the mortgage pool until maturity or 
termination . One of the success factors of Ginnie Mae is the stringent 
requirements of becoming a MBS issuer. The eligibility requirements that an 
institution must satisfy before becoming a Ginnie Mae issuer are that the 
prospective issuer must: 
• be approved by Ginnie Mae. The approval requirements include net worth 
requirements and being an approved FHA mortgagee; 
• get a commitment authority. This will give an issuer a specified maximum 
dollar amount of Ginnie Mae MBSs; 
• enter into a contract with document custodian (DC). The DC has to meet 
Ginnie Mae eligibility requirements. The DC also works under the direct 
contract with the issuer and keeps safe mortgage loan, pool and loan 
package documents; 
• open custodian accounts that hold principal, interest, fax, insurance and 
escrow funds; 
• issue MBSs of minimum denominations of a given figure. 
The issuer pays investors and a guarantee fee to Ginnie Mae monthly. If the 
amount collected from the borrower is less than the amount due, the issuer adds 
an amount from its own funds to make the payment complete. If the issuer 
defaults, Ginnie Mae makes the payment to the investor, eliminating credit risk 
for the investor. 
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The interest rate on the underlying mortgages is always higher than the rate on 
the Ginnie Mae security. This is because the guarantee fee and the payment to 
the servicer are deducted from the interest received from the underlying 
mortgages. 
Freddie Mac was created in 1970, under the Emergency Home Finance Act, in 
order to develop a secondary market for conventional mortgage loans (Ginnie 
Mae, 2003d: 2). In 1971 Freddie Mac introduced its own MBS program. 
According to Freddie Mac (2003: 5), "Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have the 
same charters, same mandates and regulatory structure, but different business 
strategies." Freddie Mac does not make loans directly to homebuyers. Like 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac provides insurance guarantees, issues MBSs and 
invests in mortgage loans. Freddie Mac purchases mortgages that conform to its 
eligibility requirements from lenders and packages them into securities that are 
sold to investors. 
These agencies issue different types of MBSs depending on the type of the 
underlying mortgage pool. The types include fixed rate MBSs, adjustable rate 
MBSs, Fannie Mae Megas and Remics. A fixed rate MBS is a type backed by a 
pool of mortgages with interest rates that are fixed for the whole term of a 
mortgage. Fannie Mae issues both single class and multi-class MBSs. 
The different types of MBSs are structured in many different ways. The most 
generic structures are those of pass through securities, mortgage backed bonds 
and pay through securities. Pass through securities are single class payment 
instruments that represent direct ownership in a portfolio of assets that are 
usually similar in terms of maturity, interest rate and quality. The most common 
pass through securities are the MBSs developed by Fannie Mae and the 
"participation certificate" developed by Freddie Mac. The assets are sold to a 
grantor trust and pass through certificates are then sold to investors. 
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pooling and servicing agreement. According to Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 
49), typically this contract will provide for a number of contractual obligations 
which include the appointment of the trustee and servicer. Once the grantor trust 
is created , the originator deposits the receivables into the trust in exchange for 
pass through certificates. The originator then sells the pass through certificates to 
the investors util ising an underwriter. According to Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 
52) "the grantor trust structure has been used extensively for a number of years. 
Ginnie Mae, for example, guarantees pass-through certificates backed by 
government-insured mortgages to numerous investors." 
Obay (2000: 73) defines pay through securities as collateralised debt obligations 
of the issuer that are usually set up through the creation of a financial subsidiary 
or a conduit into which a pool of assets is sold. These securities have a fixed 
interest rate and a set schedule of payments. The most common pay through 
security is the collaterised mortgage obligation (CMO) that has a series of bond 
classes. The first CMO was developed by Freddie Mac in 1971 .The SPV for this 
structure can be a corporation or an owner trust. Once the SPV is established, 
the originator sells it its receivables . The SPV owns the assets sold and it does 
not just pass through the proceeds like the grantor trust pass through structure. 
Since it owns the assets, it can structure the debt as it pleases, for example into 
different maturity tranches. This way it eliminates the disadvantage of a single 
maturity of the pass through structure. This structure creates pay through 
securities. 
The real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICS) are an extension of the 
basic CMO. This originated in the USA when REMIC legislation was created by 
the USA government in 1986. According to Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988: 60) , 
this legislation was enacted "in order to enable issuers to issue multi-class and 
multiple maturity securities so that no tax is imposed at the REMIC level." 
However, REMICS cannot be used for non-mortgage collateral. A basic REMIC 
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structure may include any number of classes of regular interest and a single 
class of residual interest. According to Obay (2000: 79), "the regular interest 
classes or tranches are often labelled by letters (A class, B class etc) and one or 
more Z classes, similar to a zero coupon bond is included. These classes are 
assigned a fixed, floating or zero-interest rate, a fixed principal amount and 
payment conditions." Several innovations were developed from the basic REMIC 
structure. 
3.4. SUCCESS FACTORS OF FANNIE MAE, GINNIE MAE AND 
FREDDIE MAC 
3.4.1. Introduction 
The successes of the agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac can 
be attributed to a number of factors. These include the USA government's 
support, the agencies' policies, systems and procedures, the acceptance of 
ratings in the USA financial sector and the investors' perception of these 
agencies. 
3.4.2. The USA government's support 
The USA government's initiatives and support created an environment conducive 
to the successes of the agencies. These include the insurance of savings 
deposits, government mortgage insurance and tax benefits. 
The insurance of savings deposits alleviated the risks of bank runs and 
insolvency, and provided a stable source of funds. As cited by Sellon (1988, in 
Ghersi , 1991: 187), mortgage insurance had a number of consequences for 
housing. It allowed other investors besides savings and loan depositors to 
commit funds to housing with reduced credit risks. These investors, because of 
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reduced credit risks, accepted lower yields on their investment that translated to 
reduced costs for mortgagors. The government mortgage insurance program 
required standardisation of the mortgages, which was crucial to the development 
of both the primary market and the secondary mortgage market. The government 
mortgage insurance program effectively created separate markets for 
government insured and conventional mortgage loans. The conventional 
mortgage market was local in scope and was dominated by the savings and loan 
associations. The government insured mortgage market was national in scope 
and dominated by life insurance companies and mutual savings banks as 
investors. 
The USA government created the REMICs tax classification in 1987 to 
specifically benefit issuers of MBSs. The issuer of MBSs can be any form, 
corporation or trust and can issue multi class and multiple maturity securities 
without any taxation at the REMICS level. The grantor trust and the owner trust 
as SPVs issuing ABSs are not subject to tax. 
3.4.3. The agencies' policies, systems and procedures 
The other contributing factor to the success of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and 
Freddie Mac is their sound policies , systems and procedures. Examples are set 
standards for loan applications, eligibility requirements for issuers of guaranteed 
MBSs and different MBSs programs. 
3.4.4. The acceptance of ratings in the USA financial sector 
The third success factor of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac is the 
existence and acceptance in the USA financial services sector of ratings as a 
true reflection of the credit standing of a securitisation issue. For example Fannie 
Mae (2003b: 1) states that "Fannie Mae's debt obligations are treated as USA 
agency securities in the marketplace, which is just below USA treasuries and 
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above AM corporate debt." This gives the agencies' debt obligations a 
competitive advantage in the capital markets. 
3.4.5. The investors' perception of these agencies in the RMBS 
market 
The fourth success factor of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac is the 
investors' perception that these agencies have the implicit backing of the USA 
government. The USA president appoints five of the eight directors of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac respectively. This gives these agencies a political clout. 
Ginnie Mae guaranty is backed by the full faith and credit of the USA 
government. Passmore et al. (2001: 4) adds that "the agencies' charters give 
them several competitive advantages over private firms when issuing securities 
which include: 
• an exemption from Securities Exchange Commission registration 
requirements and permission to clear agencies' securities transactions 
through the Federal Reserve's book-entry system; 
• treatment of their securities as government securities in the context of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. which allows many trusts and other non-
profit organisations to purchase them; 
• the risk-based capital requirements for banks' holdings of agencies-issued 
MBSs are substantially lower than for their holdings of private MBSs; 
• the implicit USA government guarantee that backs the agencies' 
securities. This allows them to sell securities without the credit 
enhancements needed in the private sector." 
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3.5. THE SOUTH AFRICAN RMBS MARKET 
3.5.1. Introduction 
The RMBS market in South Africa dates back to 1989 when the first 
securitisation issue was a R250 million mortgage-backed issue by the then Allied 
Building Society. To date there are a few major residential mortgage-backed 
securitisations (RMBSs) that have been done in South Africa. These were done 
by ABSA Bank, Investec and SA Home Loans (SAHL). Gateway Home Loans 
(Gateway) was a government initiative aimed at creating a secondary mortgage 
market for low income earners. These transactions are briefly discussed below. 
3.5.2. Major private sector RMBS transactions in South Africa 
ABSA Bank has done a R1 billion domestic medium term note programme with 
NBC Future Guard (Proprietary) Limited as issuer. ABSA and NBC Negotiated 
Benefits Consultants (pty) Limited established a joint venture for the purpose of 
granting home loans to members of registered pension funds. This joint venture 
then entered into a home loan sale agreement with NBC Future Guard (Pty) 
Limited, the SPV, to sell home loans that comply with the eligibility criteria. 
The home loans originated by the joint venture are advanced to members of the 
registered pension funds administered by NBC. The employer undertakes to 
deduct monthly instalments from the employee's (borrower's) salary and pays the 
originator. The member's pension fund binds itself as surety for the member 
under the home loan agreement. 
The security SPV's purpose is to hold and realise security for the benefit of 
secured creditors. The owner trust's sole purpose is to own, as beneficial 
shareholder, all the ordinary shares in the capital of the SPV and to stand surety 
to the security SPV. The security SPV binds itself under a guarantee to each 
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secured creditor, including note holders, to the full amount then owing by the 
issuer to such secured creditor pursuant to occurrence of an event of default by 
the SPV. The liability of the security SPV under the guarantee is limited to the 
amounts recovered by the security SPV from an indemnity. The Pension Funds 
Act's clause 19(5) (1956) provides for the fund withdrawal benefits to be utilised 
as security for housing loans guaranteed by a fund. The eligibility criteria of the 
home loans are as follows: 
• the borrower should be a member of a fund administered by NBC and the 
fund should be registered in terms of the Pension Funds Act (1956); 
• at least one instalment should have been received in respect of such a 
home loan; 
• the interest rate on the home loan should not be less than prime minus 
1,5%; 
• the borrower should be between 18 years and 60 years old; 
• the principal balance should be between R 1 000 and R200 000 inclusive; 
• the weighted average LTV ratio of the home loan pool should not exceed 
45%; 
• the weighted average interest rate of the home loan pool should not be 
less than the prime rate minus 45 basis points. 
Private Mortgages 1 is the securitisation of home loans originated by Investec. 
The SPV, Private Mortgages 1, purchased the home loans using a warehouse 
facility provided by Investec which is also the originator. The issuance of the 
notes repaid the warehouse facility. A warehouse facility agreement is an 
agreement between the SPV, the originator and the security SPV whereby the 
originator grants a loan facility to the SPV for the purpose of funding the 
acquisition of home loans which facility is to be repaid from the proceeds of the 
issue of asset-backed securities (ABSs). The eligibility criteria of the home loans 
are as follows: 
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• the maximum term should be 20 years and the remaining term at least 10 
years; 
• at the time of sale, the minimum amount should be at least R250 000 and 
the maximum amount R2,5 million; 
• the home loan should have a variable rate of interest; 
• at the time of sale the LTV ratio should be less than 100%; 
• borrowers are required to take out and maintain homeowner's insurance; 
• at least four instalments should have been received in respect of such a 
home loan. 
SAHL was launched in February 1999 as a private company with seven 
shareholders, most of the shares being held by Standard Bank Invest 
Corporation Limited (32,29 per cent) and Peregrine Strategic Investment 
(Proprietary) Limited (30,27 per cent) . (Van Zyl, 2003: 275) . SAHL originates 
home loans using its own sales agents, a telecentre, web-based applications and 
third party agents. Properties are registered in the client's name and the 
mortgage loans are housed in the SPV called Thekwini, which is insolvency 
remote. Thekwini is overseen by independent trustees and auditors. SAHL is the 
servicer of the home loans. 
SAHL has done four securitisation transactions namely Thekwini 1, Thekwini 2, 
Thekwini 3 and Thekwini 4. Thekwini 4 is the sixth publicly rated securitisation of 
home loans in South Africa. When a borrower takes out a home loan from SAHL, 
the loan agreement is between the borrower and the funding vehicle . Main Street 
65 is the special purpose vehicle for Thekwini 4. The funding vehicle funds the 
home loans through a wholesale facil ity from Standard Bank. The borrower 
grants an indemnity to a guarantee trust, which initially guarantees the 
performance of the home loans to Main Street 65. The guarantor trust holds all 
the mortgage rights of home loans originated by SAHL, irrespective of the vehicle 
used to fund the home loan. As a result SAHL is able to transfer home loans 
between funding vehicles without involving the Deeds Office, hence reducing the 
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time and costs. Thekwini 4 purchases home loans from Main Street 65 using the 
proceeds from the issuance of notes to investors. Main Street 65 uses the funds 
to repay the wholesale loan. The home loan eligibility criteria are as follows: 
• the loan should be residential located in South Africa which is freehold or 
sectional title units in complexes of less than 10 storeys; 
• the maximum term should be 20 years; 
• the minimum amount is R100 000 (or R75 000 for a home loan granted in 
terms of an approved employee benefit scheme); 
• the maximum amount is R2 million; 
• the LTV ratio should be less than 80% and the payment to income (PTI) 
ratio should be less than 30%; 
• borrowers are required to take out and maintain homeowner's insurance 
cover. 
3.5.3. Gateway Home Loans (Gateway) 
Gateway was established as a subsidiary of the National Housing Finance 
Corporation (NHFC), after the concept of a secondary home loan market was 
endorsed at the Presidential Job Summit in October 1998. Gateway (2000: 6) 
cites that Gateway was established in March 1999 as a partnership between the 
government and the private sector for a period of two years after which 
Gateway's performance was to be evaluated. 
The Gateway model was the only securitisation initiative of low income housing 
finance in South Africa. Originators were paid an origination fee of R1 000 per 
loan originated and sold to Gateway and a monthly servicing fee of 1 per cent per 
annum on the outstanding balance of the loan (Gateway, 1999: 4). Gateway's 
target market was the formally employed that could not afford a mortgage loan, 
but needed a larger micro loan that was not available at the time (Tomlinson, 
2000: 5) . 
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The NHFC assumed Gateway's administrative and secretarial services. Gateway 
accredited loan originators who originated mortgage loans that conformed to set 
criteria. Gateway's target loan range was between R20 000 and R50 000. Its 
initial loan product was called Makhulong Home Loan and had three key 
characteristics: 
• repayment by payroll deduction; 
• collateral was obtained from guarantees from retirement funds of at least 
50 per cent; 
• it was to be used only for the purchase of a house (Department of 
Housing, 2003: 15). 
Standard Bank and Nedcor Bank were the first originators. Gateway also 
embarked on accrediting micro lenders and smaller banks that had an interest in 
originating housing loans. There were only three institutions that became 
involved. These were Cash and Savings Bank Limited (Cashbank) a second tier 
bank, South Financial Services (Pty) Limited (trading as Southfin) a micro lender 
and Greenstart Home Loans (Pty) Limited (Greenstart), which was established 
specifically to take advantage of the Gateway model (Mood ley, 2003: 79). 
In mid 2000 Gateway introduced the primary market originators (PMO) concept. 
This concept entailed accrediting loan originators known as brokers. The brokers 
were formed to fill the gap between the banks and borrowers. They acted as 
intermediaries and brought business to the banks, and were paid commissions 
for successful transactions. They also acted as intermediaries between micro 
lenders and borrowers, where the concept was more suited than to the big 
banks. This was because micro lenders were small institutions without a large 
branch network and it was cost effective for them to use brokers to get business 
(Mood ley, 2003: 80). 
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It is notable that Gateway did not issue MBSs to fund mortgage purchases. 
Gateway did not accept a proposal by Standard Bank to buy its fully guaranteed 
loan (FGL) book funded by issuing MBSs. The NHFC was not prepared to take 
the major portion of the risk (Gateway Home Loans, 2000: 17). 
A decision was taken in early 2001 to absorb Gateway into the NHFC during a 
restructuring of the NHFC. The external shareholders' shares were bought out by 
the NHFC. Gateway was absorbed into the Home Ownership Division of the 
NHFC. 
3.5.4. Failure factors of Gateway 
Gateway's failure has been attributed to a number of reasons by different 
practitioners and academics. According to Craven and Mothapo (2001: 1), 
reasons for Gateway's failure were that: 
• the banks were hesitant to provide finance to the lower-end of the market; 
• the government failed to provide security of R300 million to cut the cost of 
lending; 
• Gateway was not run effectively and efficiently. 
Jara (2001: 1) states that the banks' view is that Gateway failed because it did 
not plan its activities with them and that its target market should have been those 
with a monthly income above R3 500. 
According to Moodley (2003: 77), Gateway failed for a number of reasons. There 
was a lack of a primary market to originate loans and the banking sector was not 
willing to support the programme. There was no concerted effort from Standard 
Bank and Nedcor, who were signed up as originators, to originate loans. 
"Standard Bank, in particular, had a large captive market in terms of employers 
and pension funds that they signed up for their fully guaranteed loan book. They 
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were reluctant to use existing agreements as they believed that such agreements 
were specific to the product being offered by them and new agreements would 
have to be signed between Gateway, the employers and the pension funds for 
the new product to be rolled out. From Standard Bank's perspective, it did not 
make business sense for them to market a loan that was in competition with their 
fully guaranteed loan product which was structured without any risks for 
themselves." 
Moodley (2003: 77) cites that the originating software that Gateway developed 
did not materialise. This was because for the entire system to work, the 
origination system had to access the system of the credit bureau and the credit-
scoring system which were located at remote sites. Synchronising these various 
systems and making them work together was a complicated and time-consuming 
task. Cashbank experienced liquidity problems in the last half of the year 2000. It 
then merged with BOE bank to create a new entity. 
Moodley (2003: 80) further adds that Gateway's PMO concept failed because the 
originators and the brokers did not have systems to pre-qualify borrowers nor 
verify their creditworthiness. The brokers were used to completing loan 
applications and forwarding them to financial institutions for further processing. 
This resulted in very few applications qualifying in terms of the stipulated criteria. 
The PMO concept was in contravention of the exemption granted by the Minister 
of Finance to the NHFC. The NHFC was exempted from the provisions of the 
Banks Act (1990), but was prohibited from providing a retail service directly to 
end users in competition with the banks. 
Kothari (2003b: 5) notes that "during the first year of its operations, Gateway 
failed to buy any loans. Gateway has not been able to convince banks and 
housing lenders to sell their portfolios to it. Gateway feels that unless there is a 
primary market in housing loans, there is no scope for creating a secondary 
market." 
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3.6. RISKS IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITISATION (RMBS) 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Securitisation transactions, like any other financial transactions, have risks that 
need to be identified and managed for the process to be worthwhile to any 
organisation's value chain . The risks in RMBS are mainly interest rate risk, 
prepayment risk, reinvestment risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, yield curve risk, 
exchange rate risk, incident, inflation and counterparty risk. These are briefly 
discussed below. 
3.6.2 Interest rate risk 
Interest rate risk arises where there is a mismatch between the interest rate on 
the receivable and the interest rate on the funding loan. This may arise for 
example if the underlying assets in a securitisation transaction generate a prime 
rate-linked return to the SPV, but the investors require a fixed rate of return. 
Oliver and Sallis (2003: 4) note that through the use of derivatives, such as 
interest rate swaps, both variable and fixed rate securities can be issued by the 
SPV without exposing the issuer to interest rate risk. If the underlying assets 
generate a prime-linked return to the SPV, for example, but the investor requires 
a fixed rate of return, a floating for fixed swap is used to hedge this interest rate 
risk. Alternatively if the securitised assets generate a fixed return but the investor 
requires a floating return , the SPV can enter into a swap or a cap with a 
reputable counterparty so that the counterparty pays the excess of floating over 
the fixed on the receivables. 
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3.6.3. Prepayment risk 
According to Eppel (2001: 1) prepayment arises in RMBS "when the SPV 
receives settlements in excess of contractually required principal payment." The 
risk of a prepayment happening is called prepayment risk. As a result the MBS 
cash flows might not be forecast with certainty. 
In the USA, the government agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac 
guarantee timely payment of interest and principal to investors. The investors 
carry only prepayment risk. When a prepayment is done the investor receives 
only the mortgage's outstanding principal, not any market premium. According to 
Guttery et a/. (1995, in Obay, 2000: 78), "this is equivalent to a borrower calling a 
bond away from an investor at its par value even though the bond's market value 
is set above par." As a result this reduces the potential gains to the investor when 
interest rates fall. 
Eppel (2001 : 1) cites that "refinancing is one of the biggest factors that contribute 
to prepayments. High levels of refinancing occur in the case of fixed rate loans 
when interest rates fall, while for floating rate loans, high levels of refinancing 
occur when rates are expected to rise. " Mortgage backed derivatives were 
created to reduce the interest rate and prepayment risks associated with 
traditional fixed rate MBSs. 
3.6.4. Reinvestment risk 
The other risk that MBS investors face when interest rates decline is that of 
reinvestment as they can only do so at lower returns. Rees (2003: 15) states that 
th is can also arise as a result of "a prepayment of high interest bearing 
receivables when the SPV cannot reinvest the proceeds at the same rate in the 
market pending payment of the funding loan, so that there is a timing mismatch 
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between the prepayments of the receivables and the next interest payment on 
the funding loan." 
This exposure may be managed with the use of a guaranteed investment 
contract (GIC). The GIC guarantees a reinvestment rate on all cash flows 
received prior to the scheduled payment date. The contract should be entered 
into with a reputable third party at a predetermined interest rate. Obay (2000: 75) 
states that "the GIC eliminates prepayment uncertainty and creates an 
investment opportunity." Rees (2003: 16) also cites that "a cash fund generated 
by a subordinated loan or a class NB note structure can reduce this risk." 
3.6.5. Liquidity risk 
This risk arises, as cited by Faure (2002b: 65), when a mortgage backed bond is 
sold below its true value, "i.e. at a price that is lower than the prices of recent 
trade in bonds of the same maturity/duration . This may happen if the bond 
market happens to be less liquid at the time of selling." Liquidity risk is also the 
risk of a timing mismatch between mortgage payment recoveries (because of 
their terms or because the mortgage obligor delays payments) and the interest 
on and the repayment on the MBS. Changes in interest rates may further 
increase the cash flow mismatch between assets and liabilities. 
Credit enhancement using a cash reserve account reduces liquidity risk. Liquidity 
risk can also be reduced by an immunisation technique whereby the duration of 
the asset pool will be matched to the duration of the liability it is expected to fund . 
This way the interest rate risk for assets will be made equal to the interest rate 
risk of the liabilities. In case of an interest rate decrease or increase movement, 
the portfolio must be re-immunised by rebalancing the portfolio to match the 
duration of the liabilities. Various derivative instruments can be used to adjust 
asset duration so as to ensure that matching is present. For example, buying 
bond futures increases duration while selling bond futures decreases duration. 
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There is no assurance that a secondary market of issued MBS will develop, or if 
that secondary market develops that it will provide investors with liquidity of 
investment, or that it will continue for the life of such MBSs. In South Africa, 
Oliver and Sallis (2003: 4) note that, "historically, the majority of investors in 
securitised paper held the instruments to term." This is because the South 
African secondary market for ABSs was still in its early stages. When the Sasfin 
Group listed the paper issued by its securitisation vehicle in 1991, there was 
minimal trade in the instruments, which resulted in the decision to de-list. 
Liquidity risk may be alleviated through liquidity support by financial institutions. 
The USA government played a pivotal role in establishing the RMBS market 
through the participation of agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
These agencies bought mortgage pools and guaranteed payments on mortgage 
backed securities, increasing liquidity in the secondary mortgage market. 
3.6.6. Credit risk 
Fannie Mae (2003d: 2) defines credit risk as "the possibility that the issuer or 
another party may have its credit rating downgraded by a rating agency; may 
experience changes in the market's perceptions of its creditworthiness; or may 
default on its financial obligations to the investor. " The obligations include 
payment by the SPV of the different kind of fees, periodic interest and principal 
value at maturity of the MBSs. 
Credit risk can be mitigated by credit enhancement. This risk can also be 
managed by ensuring that there is sufficient subordination of claims and 
transferring the credit risk to another party using credit derivatives, namely 
guarantees, insurance policies, credit default swaps and total return swaps. 
Guarantees or insurance policies are the most traditional form of credit 
derivative. Credit default swaps cover default and events like a downgrade in the 
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credit rating of the securities. Total return swaps swap the total return generated 
from the asset for a predetermined fixed return. 
Investors rely on the rating assigned to the MBS by a rating agency to assess the 
credit quality of the investment because the SPV does not have a history of 
financial performance that can be evaluated. However, a security rating is not a 
recommendation to buy, sell or hold securities as it may be subject to revision, 
suspension or withdrawal at any time by the rating agency. A rating assigned by 
another rating agency that has not been requested by the SPV to do so, may be 
lower than the equivalent ratings assigned by the chosen rating agency. There is 
no assurance that a rating will remain for any given period of time. If the 
assigned rating is given on a national scale, there can be no assurance of any 
connection between that rating and any international scale rating. 
An example of the non-permanence of a rating will be useful: the Kiwane 
transaction , sponsored by Real Africa Durolink and Gensec Bank, was extolled 
as one of a few successful securitisations in South Africa. Thomas (2002: 34) 
states that "failure of Saambou Bank shook confidence prompting rating 
agencies to adopt a defensive stance. Fitch downgraded Kiwane's senior bonds 
from an AA- investment grade rating to a B-. Fitch's concerns involved Kiwane's 
R34 million exposure to Saambou promissory notes (6,74 per cent of its portfolio) 
as well as the spread of assets. Gensec chose to offer Kiwane's 12 per cent 
K001 bondholders a buyout escape route at 150 basis points above the R150 
government bond rate on March 14, 2002." The offer was much below where the 
K001 should have been trading . As a listed asset-backed securitisation issue, the 
K001's demise was a reminder of the lurking risk a downgrading holds for any 
listed security. 
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3.6.7. Yield curve risk 
Yield curve risk applies to a portfolio of mortgage-backed bonds. A yield curve 
presents, graphically, the relationship between the rate and the maturity of a 
number of bonds at a particular time. According to Faure (2002a: 64) "yield curve 
risk has two dimensions. (Firstly) the curve may shift in a parallel fashion or a 
non-parallel fashion to reflect changes in expectations. This of course means that 
the prices of the bonds in the portfolio change. (Secondly) the prices of the 
different bonds do not change by the same extent in the case of a parallel shift, 
because of the different maturities and the different coupon rates. It is likely that 
the individual bonds have different coupon rates, including those of the same 
maturity." 
3.6.8. Exchange rate (currency) risk 
Exchange rate risk is the risk that the movement of one currency in relation to the 
local currency affects negatively the securitisation transaction. This may arise 
when an SPY is established in a tax efficient jurisdiction or when MBSs issued 
are not denominated in the local currency. The investor has the risk that the 
currency in which the MBSs are denominated depreciates and as a result will 
receive less interest and principal. 
3.6.9. Incident risk 
According to Faure (2002a: 65) this risk arises when incidents happen that affect 
the interest and/or principal payments on an MBS. The varieties of incident risk in 
RMBS are regulatory and political risks. Regulatory risk arises as a result of a 
change in laws or regulations that affect the status of a security. Political risk may 
arise when a new government changes the terms and conditions of existing 
issues of MBSs. 
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The security for the MBS consists mainly of SPV's interest in the home loans. If 
property values in the residential property market experience an overall decline, 
this could result in the value of the security created by the home loans being 
significantly reduced and may result in losses to the investors. 
3.6.10. Inflation risk 
According to Faure (2002a: 66) inflation risk is the risk that the real rate of 
interest earned on an MBS falls due to inflation. 
3.6.11. Counterparty risk 
The SPV is exposed to counterparty risk with respect to contracts entered with 
other parties like the liquidity facility agreement and hedging transactions. 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
In RMBS, mortgage originators pool together mortgages and sell them to 
bankrupt remote SPVs. The SPVs fund the purchase of these mortgages by 
issuing MBSs. 
The RMBS market originated in the USA in the 1960s after a culmination of 
housing finance reforms that started after the great depression of the 1920s. Its 
success is attributed to the active support of government and the participation of 
agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. The support of government 
included the insurance of savings deposits and the government mortgage 
insurance. The insurance of savings deposits reduced the risks to financial 
losses, and the government mortgage insurance allowed investors to commit 
funds to housing. It may be argued that the participation of the agencies Fannie 
Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac was the key to the successes of the USA 
secondary mortgage market and the RMBS market. 
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The USA RMBS process may be summarised as follows. Mortgage originators 
pool conforming mortgages which back the issue of MBSs. The government 
agencies FHA and VA insure the mortgages. Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and 
Freddie Mac guarantee full and timely payment of principal and interest on their 
MBSs. According to Livingston (2001 : 179), the default problem "has been 
overcome by the guaranteeing of mortgages by government agencies and by 
private insurance companies. The resulting guaranteed mortgage trades as if it 
is default free". The SPVs fund the purchase of these mortgages by issuing 
MBSs. 
The two most common MBSs structures that were discussed are pass through 
securities and pay through securities. The main reason why a pass through 
structure may be chosen over a pay through structure is the true sale of assets 
for accounting and regulatory purposes. However, pass through securities 
structures have two disadvantages. The structure is limited to the issuance of 
only one tranche of securities, e.g. only a 5 year tranche or a 10 year tranche. 
This limits the number of interested investors. The structure also involves high 
prepayment risks. The advantages of a pay through structure are that the 
securities can be issued in multiple classes and there is limited prepayment risk 
to the investors. 
The South African RMBS market was discussed . There are a few major RMBS 
transactions done in South Africa. However, the successful ones were not 
focused on low income earners and were initiatives of the private sector. 
Gateway was a government initiative to try and address housing finance 
problems for low income earners. The initiative was not a success and its failure 
factors were highlighted. The main reason cited by many experts and academics 
was a lack of a primary market as the banks regard this section as high risk. The 
other factors included lack of efficient and effective systems and that 
securitisation was in its early stages in South Africa . It can be argued that the 
South African government did not give as much support as compared to 
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initiatives by the USA government that led to the successes of Fannie Mae, 
Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
This chapter dealt specifically with RMBS, how it evolved, the success factors of 
the USA RMBS market, the failure factors of Gateway in South Africa, the risks 
involved and ways to mitigate them. The next chapter investigates whether 
RMBS can be applied to the South African low cost housing market. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
APPLICATION OF SECURITISATION TO LOW COST 
HOUSING FINANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) provides that housing is a 
basic human right and that the government must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right. Eradicating the housing backlog is one of the biggest 
challenges facing the South African government. 
The South African government measures adequate housing in terms of certain 
factors which include legal security of tenure, provision of basic services, 
affordability, accessibility and location. According to the Department of Housing 
(2005b: 1) in 1997 the number of families without adequate housing was 2.2 
million and this figure was expected to increase by about 204 000 per year. This 
backlog is attributed to a number of factors. These include population growth, 
urbanisation, influx of immigrants into South Africa since 1994, lack of 
affordability and lack of end-user finance. 
This chapter investigates whether there is a case for applying securitisation to 
low income housing finance in South Africa to alleviate the housing backlog. An 
overview of housing finance in South Africa as well as the measures taken to 
address low income housing backlog are discussed. The motivations to apply 
securitisation to low income housing finance in South Africa are presented and 
the chapter ends with a proposal of how this can be done. 
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As housing finance is an integral part of the financial system, an overview of the 
South African finance system is presented to give context to the discussion. The 
financial system was defined in section 2.1. There is a wide range of financial 
intermediaries and financial securities in the South African financial system as 
presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 below. The financial intermediaries can be 
broadly categorised into deposit and non-deposit intermediaries. The non-deposit 
intermediaries can further be classified into contractual, portfolio and 
development finance intermediaries. There are other intermediaries that border 
on qualifying as financial intermediaries and these can be categorised as quasi-
financial intermediaries. Some examples are investment trusts, micro-lenders, 
savings and credit co-operatives, finance companies, stokvels and securitisation 
vehicles. Securitisation vehicles intermediate on a once off basis. 
The financial securities can be described as reversible (marketable) or non-
reversible (non-marketable). The reversibility or marketability of a financial 
security is the ease with which the holders of securities (or claims) can recover 
their investments by recourse either to the issuer or to a secondary market 
(Faure, 2001: 13). 
The three categories of intermediaries make housing finance available in various 
ways. The private banks, which are deposit intermediaries, provide credit or 
loans. Contractual and portifolio intermediaries invest in mortgage-backed 
securities. Development finance intermediaries, for example the National 
Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC), provide finance to institutions that lend to 
consumers. Quasi-financial intermediaries provide micro loans, personal loans, 
revolving savings schemes. Securitisation vehicles provide liquidity to the 
mortgage primary market by buying mortgage-pooled/backed securities. Table 
4.4 presents various house finance products available to consumers. 
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TABLE 4.1: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
DEPOSIT INTERMEDIARIES 
South African Reserve Bank 
Corporation for Public Deposits 
Land and Agricultural Bank 
Private banks 
Mutual banks 
Postbank 
NON-DEPOSIT INTERMEDIARIES 
Contractual intermediaries 
Long-term insurers 
Short-term insurers 
Pension and provident funds 
Public Investment Commissioners 
Portfolio intermediaries 
Unit trusts 
Property unit trusts 
Participation mortgage bond schemes 
Development finance intermediaries (DFls) 
Development Bank of Southern Africa 
Industrial Development Corporation 
National Housing Finance Corporation 
Khula Enterprise Finance 
Infrastructure Finance Corporation 
Adapted from Faure, 2001 : 11 . 
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TABLE 4.2: NON-MARKETABLE SECURITIES 
PRIMARY SECURITIES (IE ISSUED BY ULTIMATE BORROWERS) 
Obligations of the household sector 
Hire-purchase contracts 
Leasing contracts 
Mortgage advances 
Bank overdrafts 
Personal IOUs 
Obligations of the corporate sector 
Bank loans 
Obligations of the government sector 
Bank loans 
INDIRECT SECURITIES (IE ISSUED BY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES) 
Obligations of deposit intermediaries 
Bank notes (issued by the Reserve Bank) 
Savings accounts 
Fixed deposits 
Obligations of contractual intermediaries 
Insurance policies 
Retirement annuities 
Obligations of portifolio intermediaries 
Participation mortgage bonds 
Unit trust units 
Obligations of the OFls 
Bank loans 
Adapted from Faure, 2001 : 14. 
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TABLE 4.3: MARKETABLE SECURITIES 
PRIMARY SECURITIES (IE ISSUED BY ULTIMATE BORROWERS) 
Obligations of the corporate sector 
Bankers' acceptances 
Trade bills 
Promissory notes 
Commercial paper 
Obligations of the government sector 
Treasury bills 
Government bonds 
Commercial paper (called parastatal commercial paper) 
Municipal bonds 
Public corporation bonds 
Obligations of the foreign sector 
None in rand 
INDIRECT SECURITIES (IE ISSUED BY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES) 
Obligations of deposit intermediaries (banks) 
Negotiable certificates of deposits 
Bonds of banks (for secondary capital) 
Reserve Bank debentures 
Land bank bills 
Land Bank promissory notes 
Land Bank call bonds 
Land Bank debentures 
Obligations of contractual and portfolio intermediaries 
None 
Obligations of the OFls 
DBSA bonds and bridg ing bonds 
IDC bonds 
NHFC bonds 
INCA bonds 
Adapted from Faure, 2001 : 15. 
71 
r • 
TABLE 4.4: HOUSING FINANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Terms (size, 
Product Description interest rate & Sources 
term) 
1. Retail finance products 
From R75 000 
Individual loan (to property generally over 
Personal mortgage buyer) secured by the underlying R100 000 
1.1 Banks 
loan value of the property. Can be approximately; 
guaranteed. prime (-2 to +2) ; 
10 to 20 years 
Individual loan fully secured by Generally between 
cession of accumulated R5 000 and 
Personal equity-
withdrawal benefits from pension R10 000 Banks & non-bank 
1.2 backed loans I 
I provident fund I other assets approximately; lenders 
covering bonds 
e.g. households goods. Can be prime +1 or +2; 
guaranteed. 3 to 5 years 
Institutional finance provides for 
regular payments over a number 
Depends on unit 
Specialist housing 
of years . after which housing institutions (e.g. 
size I rental 
1.3 Instalment sale asset is transferred into the Cape Town 
ownership of the occupant. 
calculation; 
community housing 
Default negates occupant's right 
4+ years 
company) 
to asset transfer. 
Individual . unsecured loan often 
Generally below 
R5 000 to R10 Non-bank lenders 
Unsecured small used for housing purposes. 
1.4 000; (e.g. Kuyasa Fund. 
loan Exempted from Usury Act 
provisions. 
approximately uTshani Fund) 
40%; 1 to 5 years 
Very small individual loan at high 
interest rate to cover Generally below 
Savings-linked 
administrative costs and high R5000; 
1.5 risk profile. Generally partly approximately As in 1.4 above. 
micro-loan 
secured against regular savings 40%; 6 months to 2 
history of borrower. Exempted years 
from Usury Act provisions. 
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Individual building material credit 
Special 
1.6 
Building materials provided by building materials Generally similar to 
programmes (e.g. 
credit facility suppliers (backed by balance of micro-loans 
subsidy) TUSK) 
2. Savings schemes 
Regular savings Special 
Savings-backed 
Regular savings records used to coupled with programmes (e.g. 
2.1 "queue" subsidy beneficiaries. interest. May be Nurcha's national 
subsidy schemes 
Can offer access to credit. used as a deposit savings 
for credit. programme) 
Various. Members 
contribute same 
Personal loans and stokvel 
amounts on a 
Personal loans I savings schemes are common 
2.2 revolving savings mechanisms through which 
regular basis, with 
Stokvel schemes 
schemes households accumulate small 
full proceeds being 
lump sums of cash for housing 
given to a member 
on a revolving 
basis. 
Adapted from Gardner, 2003: 48 . 
Credit is advanced by financial institutions on certain criteria and conditions and 
for various products. The moderate and high-income sector earning more than 
R8 000 per month which is approximately 10% of the population can afford a 
conventional house and for this category a mortgage finance system operates 
successfully. Successful residential mortgage backed securitisation (RMBS) in 
South Africa, covered in section 3.5.2, targeted this category. The RMBS 
enhances liquidity in the primary mortgage market for this category. 
The low income sector, which is approximately 20%-30% of the market, 
accesses housing finance through housing development institutions that have 
been established to facilitate access to finance specifically for this sector, either 
through banks or non-banks. Tomlinson (2000: 2) cites that "research has 
revealed that these borrowers (low income sector) prefer to borrow smaller 
amounts for shorter periods of time and with a fixed interest rate. Hence, since 
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the mid 1980's the banks have offered a non-mortgage backed product called a 
micro loan." The micro loans, however, are very small and can only assist with 
incremental building rather than buying a complete house. The mortgage finance 
system for the low income sector is negligible. Gateway Home Loans (Gateway) 
was a government initiative aimed at creating a secondary mortgage market and 
RMBS for this low income sector in an effort to promote the mortgage primary 
market. This , however, was not a success as indicated in section 3.5.3. Since the 
demise of Gateway in 2001 , the secondary mortgage market and RMBS for low 
income housing finance in South Africa is non-existent. 
The bottom 60% of the population which comprises the very low income (less 
than R3 500) and the unemployed do not have access to housing credit 
(Tomlinson, 2001 : 1). This sector is el igible for the government housing subsidy 
which is covered in section 4.3.4. 
Banks are the biggest, and arguably the most important, source of housing credit 
to consumers. "Banks are the only group of financial intermediaries that have a 
relationship with all ultimate lenders and borrowers, as well as all other financial 
intermediaries" (Faure, 2001 : 52) . In South Africa the biggest four commercial 
banks, ABSA, Standard Bank, Nedcor Bank and First National Bank, boast about 
80% of the deposit market. They are therefore at the very centre of the financial 
system . Banks have the ability to create additional money when required, for 
example by offering overdraft facilities. Should this not be controlled , this would 
result in the increase in money supply and consequently inflation. The South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) supervises banks. The Banks Act 94 of 1990 and 
the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 are the two most important 
pieces of legislation that regulate the businesses of the banks. Sections 70, 72 
and 73 of the Banks Act 94 of 1990 provide the prudential requirements that 
banks have to comply with . The South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 
requires banks to comply with the cash reserve requirement. 
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The above overview highlights the sophistication of the South African finance 
system. Faure (2001 : 5) adds that "in fact , South Africa's financial services are 
even superior to those of some first world countries." Despite the sophistication 
of this financial system the lack of low income housing finance remains one of 
the biggest contributors to housing backlog. The South African government has 
taken a number of measures in an attempt to address low income housing 
finance issues. These are discussed in the next section. 
4.3. MEASURES TAKEN TO ADDRESS LOW INCOME HOUSING 
FINANCE 
4.3.1. Introduction 
The government has formulated and implemented a housing policy in an attempt 
to address housing challenges that include lack of housing finance for low 
income earners. According to the Department of Housing (2005b: 7) the South 
African national housing policy is being undertaken in terms of seven key 
strategies which are discussed in the following subsections. The strategies are: 
• stabilising the housing environment, 
• mobilising housing credit, 
• providing subsidy assistance, 
• supporting the people's housing process, 
• co-ordinating government investment in development, 
• rationalising institutional capacity and 
• facilitating speedy release and servicing of land . 
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During the 1980s and early 1990s, financial institutions engaged in lending in the 
townships. During the period of political transition the number of defaulters 
increased. The reasons for defaults included loss of income, bad workmanship 
by unscrupulous builders and political boycotts. The culture of boycotts arguably 
carried on after the democratic elections in 1994. As a result of that and other 
factors, some lenders became reluctant to lend to low income families. The 
situation was worsened by "red-lining", a practise whereby banks refuse to grant 
home loans in certain areas. Gumede (2002: 34) cites that "the banking sector 
was reluctant to abandon the practice (redlining) fearing large scale default on 
loans." The legal processes could not assist the banks. The sheriffs refused to 
carry out their duties in certain areas for fear of victimisation . In areas where 
evictions were carried out, the evicted households moved back into the property. 
Servcon (2005a: 1) cites that because of that situation, "the protection afforded a 
lender by the mortgage instrument became worthless and loans were effectively 
reduced to unsecured personal loans." Banks then stopped lending in those 
areas. 
This strategy aims at creating a stable environment for housing, alleviating the 
perceived risk in the low income housing market and ensuring good quality 
housing. To stabilise the housing environment, the government established a 
number of housing institutions, entered into agreements with the banking sector 
and passed legislation in favour of housing consumers. The institutions 
established were the Home Loan Guarantee Company (HLGC), the National 
Home Builders Registration Council (NHBRC), the Mortgage Indemnity Fund 
(MIF), Servcon Housing Solutions (Servcon) and Thubelisha Homes. The 
agreements entered into were the record of understanding (ROU) and the new 
deal. The pieces of legislation that were passed are discussed in section 4.3.9 
below. 
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HLGC was established in 1989. Its mandate is to facilitate access to finance for 
low-income housing. It provides guarantees of last resort for mortgage-backed 
and non mortgage-backed finance. It also provides, mobilises and manages 
mortgage insurance. 
As part of an initiative to get the financial institutions to start lending again in 
those affected areas, the ROU was signed in October 1994 between the 
government and the then Association of Mortgage Lenders (now called the 
Banking Council). The purpose of the ROU was to increase the availability of 
house credit to the low income sector and secondly to implement risk alleviation 
interventions. The activities undertaken to increase the availability of credit will be 
discussed under the mobilising housing credit strategy in section 4.3.3 below. 
The activities undertaken to alleviate the perceived risk in the low income sector 
include the Masakhane campaign , the NHBRC, the MIF and Servcon. 
The Masakhane campaign was initiated by the Departments of Housing and 
Constitutional Development and the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) office which is now defunct. This campaign aims at 
encouraging communities to pay their rates, services, mortgage and rental 
payments and encourages individuals to feel a sense of community pride. 
The NHBRC was registered in June 1995 as a section 21 company. Its mandate 
is to ensure good quality standards for the home building industry and to protect 
home owners from unscrupulous contractors. The NHBRC initially focused on 
homes valued between R20 000 and R250 000. However, the Housing 
Consumers Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998 (HCPM Act) increased the 
mandate to regulate all home builders irrespective of the cost of the house. 
Section 10 of the HCPM Act requires all home builders to register with the 
NHBRC except owner builders. This registration remains valid for a year. As one 
of the requirements, the home builder must notify the NHBRC inspectorate within 
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sufficient time, during construction phase, to allow the NHBRC to do inspection at 
its discretion (NHBRC, 2005a: 1). 
NHBRC (2005b: 1) cites that it deals with three types of complaints. These are 
rectification of defects by the builder within three months of the date of 
occupation, one-year warranty against roof leaks and a five-year major structural 
defects period. If the matter falls outside the scope of the HCPM Act, the NHBRC 
advises the parties to resolve the matter through legal proceedings. This, 
however, poses a challenge to low income earners who may not be able to afford 
legal proceedings or may not be aware of their rights as house consumers. 
Sisulu (2004: 5) cites that by June 2004 NHBRC had registered 19 448 
homebuilders, 281 462 homes, conducted 470 921 inspections and received 16 
288 complaints. The boom in the South African residential home market in the 
past few years might have presented capacity challenges for the NHBRC. The 
huge number of reported complaints indicates that the quality of houses being 
built leaves a lot to be desired. 
The MIF was a wholly owned government company that was established in June 
1995 for a three year period. The mandate for the MIF was to encourage 
financial institutions to lend in the affordable housing market in neglected areas 
in the country. It did so by providing indemnity insurance against those areas 
where financial institutions were unable to repossess properties as a result of a 
breakdown in the due process of law. Tomlinson (2000: 4) cites that by the time 
the MIF was closed, it had accredited fifteen financial institutions and provided 
indemnity cover in 543 areas. As a result 140 000 mortgages were granted by 
financial institutions with a value of over R10 billion. 73 000 loans of the 140 000 
loans granted were in the subsidy-linked segment with a value of R4.1 billion. 
Servcon was established in June 1995 as a private company where the 
government and the Banking Council each own 50% share. Servcon (2005a: 1) 
points out that "Servcon was established to provide management services on a 
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uniform basis on behalf of all participating banks and specifically to assist 
borrowers and ex-borrowers in difficulty." The ROU was terminated in 1998 and 
the new deal was signed between the government and the banks. The new deal, 
signed in April 1998, gave Servcon a renewed mandate and ensured that all 
properties in possession (PIPs) and non-performing loans (NPLs) covered by 
MIF were to be managed by Servcon. The Department of Housing (2005a: 1) 
cites that Servcon's renewed mandate is to provide management services with 
respect to a portifolio comprising 33 322 PIPs and NPLs with a value of R1 .3 
billion for a period of eight years from 1 April 1998 to 31 March 2006. Servcon's 
objective is to satisfactorily dispose of a loan in its portifolio. Moroka (2003: 2) 
defines to satisfactorily dispose of as to have the property normalised and 
removed from Servcon's portifolio (returned to the bank) through a payment 
normalisation programme which offers a number of options. The options are 
instalment sale, right-sizing programme and rescheduled payment. In terms of 
the instalment sale, households can buy back their repossessed property on a 
subsidised instalment programme. The rescheduled payment option allows for 
the loan balance to be recalculated and the loan repayments rescheduled. The 
right-sizing programme assists households in finding alternative affordable 
accommodation. 
Sisulu (2004: 5) cites that by June 2004 Servcon had disposed of 19 783 
properties. In doing so Servcon faced a number of challenges. Moroka (2003: 3) 
cites that the eviction process takes a long time to be implemented because of 
widespread disrespect and defiance of the law. Moroka (2003: 3) further points 
out lack of education, lack of financial discipline, poor community leadership, the 
absence of a vibrant mortgage secondary market and the effects of HIV/AIDS on 
breadwinners. Moroka (2003: 5) , however, argues that "the issue is not really a 
housing problem, but rather a mixture of social , justice, safety and security, 
economic as well as housing. " Since the August 1997 deadline for Servcon, 
there were more than 20 000 townsh ip bondholders who had defaulted (Servcon, 
2005b: 1). This highlights that the cause of the problem was not being addressed 
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even though Servcon was delivering on its mandate. A number of interventions 
including educating the housing consumers, good lending criteria and policies to 
deal with defaulters need to be considered. Sisulu (2005: 4) pointed out that 
Servcon will be terminated in 2006 as per its mandate. 
Thubelisha Homes was established in 1997 jointly by Servcon and the 
government as a section 21 company. Moroka (2003: 2) cites that Thubelisha 
Homes's mandate is to provide houses suitable for right-sizing so that Servcon's 
payment normalisation programme can be fully implemented. Thubelisha (2005: 
1) cites that it has to-date built over 7 000 homes in six provinces. When Servcon 
is terminated in 2006 Thubelisha Homes will serve a different purpose within the 
Department of Housing, probably building capacity at local government level 
(Sisulu, 2005: 4). 
Thubelisha Homes faces a number of challenges in implementing its mandate. 
Some Servcon clients object to the alternative housing as they often have large 
families or lots of furniture. In certain areas local house owners, where Servcon 
clients are to be relocated, refuse introduction of reconstruction and development 
programme or ''RDP'' houses for fear of reducing their house values. RDP 
houses, as they are better known, have a top structure which is approximately 30 
square metres in size and are built to achieve economies of scale. In certain 
instances local homeless communities refuse to be relocated and they eventually 
move into these alternative houses. 
4.3.3. Mobilising housing credit 
This strategy aims at increasing lending into the low income housing sector. 
According to the Department of Housing (2005b: 11) this strategy focuses on two 
areas which are firstly to provide guarantees supported with government funds to 
indemnify financial institutions from loss of investment, and secondly to mobilise 
credit provision so that financial institutions lend to the low income sector. 
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The initiatives to implement this strategy include the establishment of a number 
of institutions namely the Community Bank, the National Urban Reconstruction 
and Housing Agency (Nurcha), the National Housing Finance Corporation 
(NHFC), the Social Housing Foundation (SHF) and Gateway Home Loans 
(Gateway). These institutions are discussed below. The other initiative by the 
government was the signing of a memorandum of understanding on 31 March 
2005 with the banks whereby the banks pledged to lend R42 billion to low 
income earners by 2008. 
The establishment of the Community Bank in 1994 was an initiative that aimed at 
providing housing loans to low income earners. Siovo (1994: 1) cites that the first 
priority of the Community Bank was to see to it that ordinary people accessed 
loans they could afford, which would help them become first-time homeowners. 
The Community Bank, however, failed in 1995 due to liquidity problems and 
inefficient management (Okeahalam et aI., 2002 in Ngauke, 2003: 90). 
Nurcha was established in May 1995 as a non-profit section 21 company. Its 
purpose is to facilitate low cost housing development through its two 
programmes, mainly for households earning up to R1 500 per month. The 
programmes are the guarantee programme and the joint venture development 
fund. 
The guarantee programme aims at facilitating bridging finance and end user 
finance. Nurcha offers guarantees to financial institutions that lend bridging loans 
to developers and contractors of low income housing. Nurcha also assists the 
low income sector that does not meet the lending criteria of financial institutions, 
through savings linked credit schemes, housing institutions that accommodate 
both rental and instalment sale schemes and guarantees for established banks 
and non bank lenders. Nurcha (2004: 3) cites that as a result of its experience in 
savings linked credit schemes, Nurcha was appointed by government on 16 May 
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2003 as its intermediary tasked with the collection of the R2 479 contribution 
towards housing subsidies. Department of Housing (2005) cites that the joint 
venture development fund's purpose is to "invest equity into joint ventures with 
private sector developers and contractors to encourage and facilitate the 
development of housing in the R20 000 to R60 000 range" (Department of 
Housing, 2005b: 13). 
Nurcha (2004: 1) highlights that although it financed over 400 projects involving 
emerging contractors, it incurred more than R6 million losses on failed projects. 
However, Nurcha facilitated and financed a total of 135 424 houses since its 
establishment (Nurcha, 2005: 1). 
The NHFC was established in April 1996 as a public company wholly owned by 
the government. The NHFC (2005a: 1) cites that "the NHFC addresses the 
housing finance needs of the housing market that have an ability to contribute 
financially to their housing costs, but to whom bank-funded housing finance is not 
readily available." This sector has a household monthly income of between R1 
500 and R7 500 and is not eligible for full government housing subsidies. 
The NHFC does not lend directly to individual borrowers, but to social housing 
institutions and approved retail finance intermediaries which are spread 
countrywide. The NHFC implements three funding programs, namely alternate 
tenure (AT), home ownership (HO) and incremental housing (IH). The three 
programs mentioned above, AT, HO and IH, aim at enabling rental, home 
ownership and improvement to property respectively. NHFC (2005b: 1) cites that 
it has "approved R2.3 billion in facilities and disbursed R1.9 billion by 31 March 
2005. Through lending activities, 51 734 new housing units have been built and 
182438 loans originated." 
The SHF was established by the NHFC in November 1997 as a section 21 
company (Department of Housing, 2005b: 13). Its purpose is to promote and 
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r ' assist the development of social housing by providing guidelines in setting up 
social housing institutions (SHls) and providing social housing policy for South 
Africa. The Department of Housing (2005b: 7) defines social housing as "being 
density subsidised housing which is managed by independent social housing 
institutions." Sisulu (2004: 5) cited that by June 2004 SHF had established 59 
SHls that had constructed 30 332 housing units. 
In addition to its programmes, the NHFC established Gateway in 1998 as an 
initiative to create a secondary mortgage market and apply securitisation to the 
low income housing market. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Gateway was 
a failure and it was absorbed into NHFC's home ownership division in 2001 . 
4.3.4. Provision of subsidy assistance 
South Africa has a high unemployment rate and relatively low average wage 
levels. According to the Department of Housing (2005b: 1) in 1996 it was 
estimated that of all families living in South Africa, 80% did not earn more than 
R3 500 per month and that more than 50% of families did not earn more than 
R1 500. This portion of the population cannot afford to provide for their own 
housing needs. This strategy aims at providing subsidy assistance to these 
households. The strategy has three different programmes, namely the housing 
subsidy scheme, the discount benefit scheme and the public sector hostels 
redevelopment programme. 
The Department of Housing (2005b: 15) states that the housing subsidy scheme, 
introduced in March 1994, "provides a subsidy to households earning up to R3 
500 so as to assist them to acquire tenure, basic services and a top structure. A 
range of subsidy mechanisms is provided, namely the individual subsidy, the 
project linked subsidy, the consolidation subsidy, the institutional subsidy, the 
relocation assistance subsidy and the rural subsidy." 
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An individual subsidy is made available to a qualifying beneficiary who wants to 
enter into a house building contract, purchase serviced stands or an existing 
property which is not part of the approved housing subsidy projects. The project-
linked subsidy is available to developers who implement the approved projects to 
enable qualifying beneficiaries to own completely built houses. A consolidation 
subsidy is for top structures to qualifying beneficiaries with serviced land from 
previous dispensation subsidies. The institutional subsidy is made available to 
qualifying institutions so that they can provide affordable rental or instalment sale 
housing to beneficiaries. The relocation assistance subsidy is for qualifying 
beneficiaries who have defaulted on their home loan and are on Servcon's 
rehabilitation programme. The rural subsidy is for qualifying beneficiaries who do 
not have legal security of tenure on land, but on functional tenure rights as the 
land belongs to the state. The rural subsidy is not only limited to the rural areas, 
but also made available in urban areas. 
The discount benefit scheme aims at providing home ownership to those 
households that have been renting state owned houses prior to 15 March 1994 
and those that intended to buy, but with outstanding loans obtained before 15 
March 1994. These households receive a maximum discount of R7 500 on the 
historic cost of the property. 
The public sector hostels redevelopment programme aims at rehabilitating 
hostels owned by provincial housing boards and municipalities so that the living 
conditions are the same as the surrounding communities. Furthermore, 
households living in these hostels will benefit up to R16 000 per family or R4 000 
per individual. 
Since the introduction of the housing subsidy scheme, the subsidy levels have 
been increased five times: in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2005. Gardner (2003: 
20) points out that the first increase was due to value added tax 01AT) exemption 
of the subsidy and the next two increases were intended to counteract the effects 
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of inflation. The last increases were to bring subsidy levels in line with inflation 
and to cover the costs of the NHBRC's product defect warranty. The government 
introduced the contribution policy in April 2002 whereby households have to pay 
a deposit of R2 479 before they could apply for housing subsidies except the 
aged, the disabled, those who were chronically sick or who planned to build their 
own houses. Households earning less than R1 500 are exempted from paying 
R2 479 from March 2005 as shown in Table 4.5 below. 
4.3.5. Supporting the people's housing process 
This strategy aims at assisting households that wish to build their own houses 
with access to the household subsidy scheme. The strategy comprises support 
organisations, funding and the People's Housing Partnership Trust (PHPT). 
Support organisations are housed in support centres that are usually easily 
accessible by all communities. These support organisations assist communities 
in applying for their subsidies, in obtaining land to build houses, and in technical 
and administrative support during construction . The funding component of the 
strategy comprises the housing subsidy scheme discussed earlier, the facilitation 
grant and the establishment grant. The facilitation grant can be used to bring 
about awareness to the communities through workshops. It is also used to 
prepare subsidy applications. The establishment grant is used by support 
organisations to provide technical, financial and administrative support to 
beneficial households. The PHPT is a national organisation that implements 
awareness programmes in support of the people housing program. It promotes 
all housing delivery processes at provincial and local levels. 
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TABLE 4.5: HOUSING SUBSIDY AMOUNTS 
Income category Subsidy amount Contribution Product price 
1. Individual , project linked and relocation assistance subsidies 
RO to R1 500 R31 929 None R31 929 
r . 
R1 501 to R3 500 R29450 R2 479 + shortfall R31 929 
Indigent: Aged, 
disabled & health R25580 None R25580 
stricken RO to R800 
2. Institutional subsidy 
Indirect-I nstitution 
RO to R3 500 R29450 At least R31 929 
must add capital 
3. Consolidation subsidies 
RO to R1 500 R18792 None R18792 
R1 501 to R3 500 R16313 R2479 R18792 
For aged, disabled 
or health stricken 
R18792 None R18792 
groups R 1 501 to 
R3500 
4 . Rural housing subsidies 
RO to R3 500 R29450 None R29450 
People's housing process 
RO to R3 500 R31 929 None R31 929 
5. Emergency housing programme 
Temporary 
R26874 Shortfall R26874 
assistance 
Services R13137 None R13137 
Houses R18792 None R18792 
6. Public sector hostels redevelopment programme 
Family units R29450 None R29450 
Individual units (per 
R7234 None R7234 
bed) 
Adapted from Department of Housing, 2005c: 1. 
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4.3.6. Co-ordinating government investment in development 
This strategy aims at maximising the impact of overall government investment 
through planning and co-ordination of activities. The Housing Act (1997) specifies 
a number of mechanisms, namely the formation of the South African housing 
development board, interdepartmental forums and policy formulation through 
housing minmec. The housing minmec is a forum where the Minister of Housing 
meets with the provincial Members of the Executive Councils (MECs) responsible 
for housing. The housing and urbanisation information system (HUIS) is an 
information system that assists in the management of the national housing policy 
by generating reports that show trends, projects performance and expenditure on 
allocations. The provincial government housing policy is co-ordinated through the 
provincial housing development boards while local government is co-ordinated in 
terms of integrated development plans. 
Housing developments need infrastructure, namely water supply, roads, 
sanitation, electricity and waste disposal. It is to be noted that infrastructure 
provision is monitored by the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
(DPLG) through the municipal infrastructure grant (MIG). Projects prioritised for 
implementation are identified by municipalities while DPLG only provides the 
funding allocation. There is a campaign by government to eradicate water and 
sanitation backlogs by 2007 and 2010 respectively. As a result municipalities 
focus on the provision of basic level of water and sanitation facilities regardless 
of inadequate housing in those areas being serviced. Furthermore, municipalities 
are water services authorities as provided for by the Water Services Act (1997) 
mandating them to provide water and sanitation services, but most of them are 
not accredited to provide housing, which remains a function of provincial 
departments. As a result most municipalities do not plan or budget for housing 
developments. 
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The need for coordinating government investment in development was 
highlighted by Sisulu (2005: 4) who stated that at a recent meeting with the South 
African Local Government Association it was discovered that in some 
municipalities there are no officials dealing with housing. 
4.3.7. Rationalising institutional capacity 
The strategy aims to create an efficient housing funding process and institutional 
system in the government sector. The South African housing fund is the single 
national housing fund. It disburses funds to provincial housing development 
funds. The statutory bodies that have been created are the South African 
housing development board and the provincial housing development boards. The 
roles in housing provision of the three spheres of government, namely the 
national, provincial and local, are set out in the Housing Act (1997). The National 
Department of Housing is implementing the national capacitation programme to 
build capacity in government to ensure efficient and effective implementation of 
housing policy. 
4.3.8. Speedy release and servicing of land 
This strategy aims at facilitating the speedy release and servicing of land for 
housing delivery. This is done mainly through the provisions of the Development 
Facilitation Act (1997). The key elements of the Development Facilitation Act 
(1997) regarding housing are the principles for land development, the 
development and planning commission (DPC), development tribunals and land 
development objectives. The Development Facilitation Act (1997) provides a set 
of principles that aims at speedily undertaking land development projects. The 
DPC is responsible for reviewing all provincial planning related legislation in 
South Africa. Development tribunals are established at provincial levels by the 
Premiers comprising of experts, officials and stakeholders. Should a dispute 
arise regarding an application for development, the tribunal is mandated to 
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resolve and impose time frames for the resolution. Each municipality is required 
by the Development Facilitation Act (1997) to set and document land 
development objectives for future land development. These objectives should 
highlight the levels of service, the number of housing units and the 
implementation approach. 
The servicing of land is guided by the national norms and standards for housing, 
NHBRC, the national building regulations, the red book and by-laws. The 
guidelines of the housing norms and standards require that up to R7 500 of the 
basic subsidy scheme can be spent on services. The remaining amount of 
subsidy in terms of the housing subsidy scheme must be spent on the top 
structure which should be a minimum of 30 square metres in size. 
4.3.9. Legislation 
The government has initiated and passed pieces of legislation in an effort to 
promote lending by financial institutions to low income earners. This section is 
not exhaustive as it intends to highlight legislation that directly impacts on the low 
income housing finance only. 
Section 26 of the Constitution (1996) provides that housing is a human right. The 
Thematic Committee (2001 :2) cites that "South Africa is one of just more than 30 
countries that have included the right to housing in its Constitution." This was 
given effect by the Housing Act (1997) which sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of all three spheres of government and the basis for the housing 
subsidy programme. 
The Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act of 1998 (HCPM Act) aims at 
protecting homeowners from unscrupulous builders. The NHBRC, established as 
a result of the HCPM Act, regulates the building industry. The Rental Housing Act 
(1999) aims at ensuring that more houses are provided for rental purposes and 
89 
L 
to regulate the behaviour of landlords. The Rental Housing Act (1999) outlaws 
the eviction of long standing tenants without mediation. 
The Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act of 2000 (HLMD Act) aims at 
monitoring financial institutions' lending practices. The HLMD Act requires banks 
to reveal information on how they handle home loan applications. The 
Community Reinvestment Bill (2002) was designed to complement the HLMD Act 
by compelling banks to lend to a specific number in the low income housing 
market. Banks that do not comply would be penalised and charged fines of up 
R500 000. The bill is still under discussion between the government and the 
banking sector. 
Other pieces of legislation impacting on the housing finance include the Public 
Finance Management Act (1999) and the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(2003). These pieces of legislation impact on how the different spheres of 
government should conduct their financial affairs. 
4.4. THE MOTIVATIONS FOR APPLYING SECURITISATION TO 
LOW INCOME HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.4.1. Introduction 
A number of interventions by the government have been done in an attempt to 
resolve the housing backlog issue. The challenge, however, remains unresolved. 
Securitisation has assisted the USA and other countries in alleviating this socio-
economic issue. This section aims at making a case for applying securitisation to 
low income housing in South Africa, under the following headings: 
• housing backlog 
• inadequate housing finance to the low income earners 
• lessons learnt from the failure of Gateway 
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• successes in other South African securitisation markets and the USA 
RMBS market 
• the sophisticated and sound financial system in South Africa. 
4.4.2. Housing backlog 
Eradicating housing backlog is a challenge that the government has been trying 
to resolve for more than a decade. Stratoudakis (1994: 16) estimated that in 
March 1994 the housing backlog was between 1.3 and 1.8 million units. Knight 
(2001: 1) cites that by July 2001 1.1 million houses have been built providing 
shelter to 5 million people. The South African housing programme is considered 
by many practitioners to be the most successful worldwide, because of achieving 
to provide the publicly announced housing target of a million houses in five years 
(Gardner, 2003:7). However, when more than a million houses were provided in 
2001 the housing backlog had increased to between 2 and 3 million houses 
translating to approximately 7.5 million people without adequate housing (Knight, 
2001 : 1). To-date the government has built 1.6 million houses, but approximately 
2.4 million people live in informal structures (Sisulu , 2005b: 3). 
Different measures discussed above were put in place which include 
establishment of housing institutions, provision of subsidies, putting institutional 
arrangements in place and passing legislation in order to eradicate the housing 
backlog. However, this issue remains unresolved. Some measures were 
delivering on their mandates, while others like Gateway and the Community Bank 
were failures. Sisulu (2005b: 3) cites that over the past ten years the government 
has spent R29.5 billion on housing. Sisulu (2005b: 3) further points out that 
"between 1996 and 2001 the number of households living in shacks (informal 
settlements) and backyards increased from 1.45 mill ion to 1.84 million reflecting 
a 26 percent increase, a figure far greater than 11 percent population increase 
over the same period." 
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Sisulu (2005b: 4) cites that a study by the Department of Housing concluded that 
at the current rate of funding against the growing backlog and rapid urbanisation, 
in ten years' time the household backlog will not have changed. As a result, the 
government has shifted emphasis from how many houses have been built to how 
many home owners have been created. This paradigm shift can be promoted by 
providing housing finance to the low income sector using securitisation. 
Securitisation has been applied successfully in other countries to address the 
same issue. 
4.4.3. Inadequate housing finance to the low income earners 
Despite the measures and initiatives taken by the government which include the 
establishment of housing institutions, passing pieces of legislation and signing 
agreements with the banks, there is still reluctance by the banks to lend to the 
low income sector. Many reasons have been advanced as to why banks in South 
Africa are reluctant to lend to the low income sectors. Sundberg and Thunstrom 
(1998: 18) pointed out that banks are reluctant to lend to the low income earners 
because of "both unwillingness to deal with low income earners and the risks 
associated with lending to this group, such as low repayment rates on loans and 
difficulties in putting pressure on defaulters." They add that there is unwillingness 
to pay by low income earners and those willing cannot afford to, for various 
reasons including loss of income, impact of HIV/AIDS and company liquidations. 
Banks cite that this sector demands small loans that are not profitable. Most 
individuals in this sector do not have any kind of security or collateral and lack 
financial discipline. A greater percentage of low income earners are first time 
home buyers who do not understand their own obligations and that of the 
different role players in housing finance. In the event of shoddy workmanship by 
the builders, often the borrowers refuse to pay their loans to the banks. 
The government has made a commitment to eradicate informal settlements by 
2014 (Sisulu , 2005c: 3). Loans advanced by alternative lenders cannot achieve 
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this target as they are not always suitable for housing finance. The use of the 
pension or provident fund as security can be risky to the borrower in the event of 
default because both the house and the security can be at jeopardy (Sundberg 
and Thunstrom, 1998: 43). Repayment periods, required for example by 
unlicensed lenders known as loan sharks, are always very short and the interest 
rates are higher than on mortgage loans. As a result repayments are very high 
for low income earners. 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) contribute to the housing finance 
system. However, in the long run they are normally not financially sustainable as 
they rely on donations. The uTshoni Fund, for example, receives donations from 
the South African government and international organisations and these 
donations cannot be guaranteed. 
Rental housing is an option that can be investigated . However, the culture of non 
payment may be a deterrent to investors. A lot of previously disadvantaged 
South Africans would want to own a house, rather than rent for life, as they never 
had the opportunity to do so in the previous dispensation. Gardner (2003: 69) 
argues that the Value Added Tax Act (1991) impacts negatively on rental housing 
"in that rental housing services are exempted from VAT, which implies that rental 
institutions are unable to claim back VAT inputs costs incurred during the 
development of such housing." 
The subsidy system had the greatest impact on the low income sector. This is 
evidenced by the 1.6 million houses built to-date. However, this system is too 
costly. To-date over R29 billion has been spent on the subsidy scheme. This 
excludes the cost of services like water, roads, sanitation and electricity provision 
which are managed and monitored by other national departments. Indications are 
that the rate of increase of housing backlog is higher than housing provision. 
There are other challenges with the subsidy system. There is always under-
expenditure of allocated amounts by provincial departments due to lack of 
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capacity. The subsidy values always decrease with time due to inflation, and as a 
result contractors' and developers' profit margins become smaller. This leads to 
shoddy workmanship by unscrupulous builders who opt for inferior cheap 
materials. Sisulu (2004: 5) cites that these government subsidy houses, also 
known as RDP houses, can be bought for R5 000 despite the fact that the 
government spends more than R25 000 per house as subsidy. Most beneficiaries 
cannot easily raise the R2 479 contribution required . Knight (2001 : 3) adds "that 
the two most important goals of GEAR, the South African government's 
macroeconomic policy, are to reduce inflation and government expenditure to 
below 4 percent of the gross domestic product. This in effect limits the amount 
which the government can spend on social needs including housing." 
Gardner (2003: 12) cites that there is a credit gap for products in the range R26 
000 to R120 000 that imposes serious constraints on housing delivery. Gardner 
(2003:35) further states that the only efficiently functioning housing submarket in 
South Africa is for households with incomes that are above R8 000 per month. 
The low income earners face a number of challenges, especially those 
households earning between R1 500 to R7 500 per month (Merten, 2005: 2). 
Households earning more than R3 500 are not eligible for government housing 
subsidies and mortgage finance is not readily available for this submarket. This 
submarket is perceived as high risk by banks. Households earning between R1 
500 and R3 500 are eligible for government housing subsidies, but they have to 
contribute R2 479. Savings linked credit or pension fund guaranteed credit's 
downside is that in the event of loss of income, the house and the savings or 
pension fund are also lost. It is imperative to consider alternative housing finance 
for low income earners. 
4.4.4. Lessons learnt from the fai lure of Gateway. 
Gateway was the South African government securitisation initiative to address 
housing finance challenge in the low income sector. The failure of this initiative 
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government, the banking sector, the building and construction sectors and the 
communities themselves. 
The banking sector, as the biggest loan originator, is not too keen to lend to low 
income earners for fear of defaults and losses. This leads to the non-existence of 
the primary mortgage market in the low income housing sector. A secondary 
market cannot exist without a primary market. The government should playa part 
in restoring law and order in affected areas where due process of law is not 
respected . As mentioned earlier, confidence can be restored by financial 
institutions if the properties of defaulters can be repossessed and successful 
evictions carried out. 
It was learnt from Gateway that a lack of proper systems and procedures 
contributes to failures of organisations. Gateway's originating software did not 
materialise and its brokers did not have proper systems in place. 
4.4.5. Successes in other South African securitisation markets 
and the USA RMBS market 
The success story of securitisation in certain South African markets shows that 
lessons can be learnt and applied to the low income housing sector. As long as 
there is a vibrant primary market and keen investors, securitisation can be a 
success. However, with the challenges in the South African low income sector 
certain measures will have to be put in place to allay the fears of perceived risks. 
Securitisation is no longer new in South Africa. The accounting, legislative and 
regulatory frameworks are conducive to innovative securitisation transactions. 
Lessons may be learnt from the success of the USA RMBS. The involvement of 
the USA government played a key role in making it a success. This was through 
the government agencies, legislation, tax incentives, guarantees and the 
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provision of resources. The agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were successful because of the USA government support, the agencies' policies, 
systems and procedures, the acceptance of ratings in the USA financial sector 
and the investors' perceptions of these agencies. 
4.4.6. The sophisticated and sound financial system in South 
Africa 
Section 4.2 highlighted that the South African finance system is highly 
sophisticated and developed to the extent that it is better than some first world 
countries. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has to date played its role 
successfully of establishing financial stability. The SARB has been able to control 
inflation within its mandated target. 
The South African investment market is well regulated. This creates an 
environment that is conducive for keen investors. The SARB regulates and 
supervises banks and micro lenders. The Financial Services Board (FSB) 
supervises various institutions such as the short and long-term insurers, 
retirement funds and investment institutions. These are the main domestic 
investors in financial instruments in South Africa. The South African legislative 
framework for institutional investors consists of the Pension Funds Act (1956), 
the Companies Act (1988) , the Long-term Insurance Act (1998) , the Short-term 
Insurance Act (1998) and the Collective Investment Schemes Control (CISC) Act 
(2002). The CISC Act (2002) replaced the Unit Trust Act (1981). The CISC Act 
(2002) has a positive impact on securitisation as investors set up in terms of this 
piece of legislation are only allowed to invest funds in securities that are listed on 
a recognised exchange. 
The Pension Funds Act's regulation 28 (1956) stipulates the maximum exposure 
(prudential investment guidelines or PIGs shown in Table 4.6 below) that a fund 
can have to each type of investment asset class. 
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TABLE 4.6: PRUDENTIAL INVESTMENT GUIDELINES 
Asset class Percentage maximum exposure 
Krugerrands 10 
Foreign assets 15 
Deposit with a single bank 20 
Single issuer of bonds (except South 20 
African government) 
Shares 75 
Shares and property 90 
Bonds 100 
Cash 100 
Adapted from Pension Funds Act's Regulation 28 (1956) 
Table 4.6 indicates that a fund can have a 100% maximum exposure to bonds or 
cash. However, Van Zyl (2003: 270) cites that "South African institutions are 
underweight in bonds. This refers specifically to the institutional investors, 
namely unit trusts, pension and provident funds, and long and short-term 
insurance companies. Only 14 per cent of the assets of these companies 
consisted of domestic bonds in 1999, while 51 per cent was allocated to 
domestic equities". Mortgage-backed securities will present alternative 
investments to the conventional ones since ABSs may be regarded as "bonds 
created in a securitisation transaction" (Hamilton, 2003: 1). 
This section aimed at making a case for the application of securitisation to low 
cost housing in South Africa. The next section presents a proposal of how this 
can be done. 
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4.5. CONCEPT OF AN EFFECTIVE SECURITISATION 
STRUCTURE TO LOW INCOME HOUSING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.5.1. Introduction 
Lack of end user finance has been cited as one of the reasons for the housing 
backlog in South Africa. Despite the measures taken by the government, which 
include establishing housing institutions, passing legislation and providing 
housing subsidies, the housing backlog is increasing at a faster rate than housing 
provision. The reluctance of banks to lend to low income earners is one of the 
biggest challenges in eradicating housing backlog. Banks have suffered heavy 
losses as a result of lending to low income housing sector due to defaults. The 
proposal of an effective securitisation structure will try to address the challenges 
in the primary mortgage market. The proposal is based on the USA securitisation 
model which used the participation of government agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. 
The proposal is based on six recommendations. The first, second and third 
recommendations aim at addressing the challenges in the primary mortgage 
market for low income earners. The fourth and fifth recommendations aim at 
establishing an effective and efficient special purpose vehicle. The last 
recommendation is on the issue of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). 
4.5.2. Recommendation 1: Closing the credit gap in the primary 
mortgage market for low income earners. 
It is proposed that the National Housing Finance Corporation (NHFC) should 
advance housing loans directly to low income earners. 
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This is recommended for the following reasons: 
• the banking sector is currently not keen to lend to low income earners; 
• the NHFC has experience with Gateway and a number of housing 
institutions it provides with wholesale housing finance. 
4.5.3. Recommendation 2: The criteria on mortgages advanced 
to low income earners. 
It is recommended that the mortgages advanced to low income earners by NHFC 
should comply with the following criteria: 
• borrowers must submit inspection certificates provided by NHBRC; 
• borrowers' income must not exceed R8 000; 
• the value of the loan should not exceed R120 000; 
• there must be an interest rate cap on the mortgage loan; 
• repayment will be by payroll deduction; 
• a percentage, minimum of 20%, would have to be guaranteed by the 
employer or a purchase of a guarantee for up to half the amount from the 
Home Loan Guarantee Company (HLGC); 
• the home owners must occupy the property. 
This recommendation is made for the following reasons: 
• inspection certificates will ensure that houses are built to required quality 
and specifications; 
• the limits to the borrower's income and to the value of the loan aim at 
covering the credit gap in the South African housing finance system; 
• the interest rate cap is proposed to make the loans affordable even if 
interest rates go up drastically; 
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• repayment by payment deduction, the guarantees and occupation by 
home owner are proposed to minimise the risk of default. 
This recommendation aims at standardising mortgages to low income earners. 
These criteria will form the basis for mortgages that will be pooled together for 
the securitisation process. 
4.5.4. Recommendation 3: The banking sector's participation in 
the primary mortgage market for low income earners. 
It is recommended that the agreement between the government and the banking 
sector on 31 March 2005 where banks pledged to lend R42 billion to low income 
earners by 2008 be amended so that the lending criteria includes 
recommendation 2 above. 
This is recommended for the following reasons: 
• to address the concerns of the banking sector. Merten (2005: 1) reported 
that the banking sector is appearing to backtrack on its R42 billion rand 
commitment by proposing the following conditions: 
i. a levy of 0.1 to 0.2 percent on the first R150 000 of all mortgages 
to establish a loss limit fund that will reimburse banks in case of 
defaults; 
ii. government to provide guarantees to low cost mortgage bonds; 
iii. government to re-establish the Mortgage Indemnity Fund (MIF); 
• this recommendation aims at creating uniformity in low income mortgages 
that can be pooled together for the securitisation process; 
• the banking sector has branches and systems in place countrywide; 
• the prospects of pooling and selling low income mortgages to the SPV will 
likely motivate the banking sector to originate loans as these assets will be 
removed from their balance sheets. 
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4.5.5. Recommendation 4: The establishment of a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV). 
It is recommended that a special purpose vehicle (SPV) of the Fannie Mae model 
be established and that the President of South Africa should appoint the majority 
of the SPV's board members. 
This is recommended for the following reasons: 
• the USA RMBS discussed in the previous chapter presented two options 
of how the agencies operate. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) while Ginnie Mae does not issue 
MBSs, but only guarantees MBSs issued by approved issuers. The Fannie 
Mae model is recommended. The Ginnie Mae model is not recommended 
because the way Ginnie Mae operates presents a few challenges if 
adopted in the South African market. The Ginnie Mae process of 
approving issuers, discussed in section 3.3.2, is quite complicated and 
better suits a more mature securitisation market; 
• the SPV will buy mortgage pools that conform to criteria set by 
recommendation 2. This will provide liquidity to the low income mortgage 
market; 
• the appointment of the board members by the President of the South 
Africa will highlight government support. 
4.5.6. Recommendation 5: The funding of the SPV 
It is recommended that the National Treasury provides a loan to the SPV for the 
first three years on a revolving credit basis. 
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This is recommended for the following reasons: 
• this will provide liquidity to the SPV which will do the same to the low 
income mortgage market; 
• it will also highlight government support to the securitisation initiative . 
4.5.7. Recommendation 6: The issuing of mortgage-backed 
securities (MBSs) by the SPY. 
It is recommended that that the MBSs issued by the SPV should satisfy the 
conditions set out in the South African regulations that apply to securitisation 
schemes. Securitisation Notice (2004: 56) provides that: 
• the minimum denomination should not be less than R1 million; 
• the commercial paper should be listed on a licensed financial exchange; 
• the instruments must be endorsed by a bank; 
• the instruments must be issued for longer than five years; 
• the instruments must be backed by an explicit national government 
guarantee. 
This is recommended for the following reasons: 
• it aims at bringing to the market alternative instruments to conventional 
ones like bonds and shares; 
• it aims at boosting the securitisation market in South Africa comparable to 
the USA. 
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
An overview of housing finance in South Africa was discussed. The secondary 
mortgage market and RMBS for low income housing finance are non existent 
because there is no primary mortgage market. The existing RMBS market for 
housing finance is for medium and high income earners, earning above R8 000 
per month, where risk is perceived by banks to be relatively low. 
The South African government housing policy was discussed. The government 
established a number of housing institutions, entered into agreements with the 
banking sector, passed legislation and provided in excess of R29 billion 
subsidies to date to housing beneficiaries. Despite these measures, housing 
backlogs and particularly low income housing finance remains a challenge. 
Motivations for applying securitisation to low income housing in South Africa 
were advanced. These include the unresolved issue of housing backlogs, 
inadequate housing finance for low income earners, lessons learnt from the 
failure of Gateway, success factors of other securitisation markets in South Africa 
as well as the USA RMBS market and the sophisticated and sound financial 
system in South Africa. The chapter ends with a proposal of how to effectively 
apply securitisation to low income housing in South Africa. It is hoped that the 
proposal will assist the authorities in resolving this socio-economic issue. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
5.1. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis is on securitisation and its application to low cost housing finance in 
South Africa. The thesis aimed at providing a general overview of mortgage 
securitisation, identifying the success factors of USA agencies Fannie Mae, 
Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac, the failure factors of Gateway of South Africa, and 
investigating whether securitisation can be used to finance low cost housing in 
South Africa 
Chapter two provided a general theoretical overview of securitisation. A brief 
introduction to the financial system was provided to give context to this financial 
innovation. The financial system is about the deficit economic units borrowing 
from surplus economic units. This can be directly or via financial intermediaries. 
Securitisation vehicles are not ongoing lenders and borrowers, and may be 
regarded as quasi-financial intermediaries as they intermediate on a once-off 
basis . A securitisation vehicle may hold a portfolio of mortgages which is 
financed by the issue of mortgage backed securities. 
Securitisation simply means the conversion of existing or future cash inflows of 
any originator into tradable securities that may be sold on the capital market. 
Different types of securitisations have evolved from the traditional type . These 
include synthetic and whole business securitisations. There are several 
securitisation structures, but the most common is the term structure. The key 
aspect of the term structure is that the originator sells its assets to the bankrupt 
remote special purpose vehicle (SPV) wh ich funds this by issuing asset-backed 
securities to the capital market. The other important aspects of the term structure 
discussed are the servicer, rating agencies, credit and liquidity support. The 
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accounting and tax treatment desired by the issuer plays an important part in 
how the securitisation transaction is structured. The South African regulations on 
securitisation provide guidelines on each of the aspects of a securitisation 
structure. 
Securitisation transactions benefit borrowers, originators and investors. 
Securitisation can benefit borrowers by providing a lower-priced source of 
finance. Securitisation benefits originators by providing future cash flows upfront, 
enabling them to meet the demand for new loans. It offers investors alternative 
investment instruments to conventional ones like bonds and shares. One of the 
concerns with securitisation is that originators may lose their incentive to 
maintain credit discipline since they sell the assets they generate. The concerns 
with securitisation highlight the need for a well regulated securitisation market. 
Chapter three provided a theoretical overview of residential mortgage-backed 
securitisation (RMBS). In RMBS, mortgage originators pool together mortgages 
and sell them to bankrupt remote SPVs. The SPVs fund the purchase of these 
mortgages by issuing mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). 
The RMBS market originated in the USA in the 1960s after a culmination of 
housing finance reforms that started after the great depression of the 1920s. Its 
success is attributed to the active support of government and the participation of 
agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. The support of government 
included the insurance of savings deposits and the government mortgage 
insurance. The insurance of savings deposits reduced the risks to financial 
losses, and the government mortgage insurance allowed investors to commit 
funds to housing. It may be argued that the participation of the agencies Fannie 
Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac was the key to the successes of the USA 
secondary mortgage market and the RMBS market. The success factors of 
Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac include the USA government's 
support, the agencies' policies, systems and procedures, the importance of 
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ratings in the USA financial sector and the investors' perception of these 
agencies. 
The South African RMBS market was discussed . There are a few major RMBS 
transactions that have been executed in South Africa. However, the successful 
ones were not focused on low income earners and were initiatives of the private 
sector. Gateway was a government initiative to try and address housing finance 
problems for low income earners. The initiative was not a success and its failure 
factors were highlighted. The main reason cited by many experts and academics 
was a lack of a primary market, as the banks regard this section as high risk. The 
other factors included lack of efficient and effective systems and that 
securitisation was in its early stages in South Africa . It can be argued that the 
South African government did not give as much support as initiatives by the USA 
government that led to the successes of Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. 
The risks associated with RMBS as well as ways to mitigate them were 
discussed. It was highlighted that one of the risks is liquidity risk as there is no 
assurance that a secondary market of issued mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
will develop and provide investors with liquidity of investment. The USA 
government played a pivotal role in establishing the secondary mortgage market 
through the participation of agencies Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Chapter four investigated whether securitisation can be used to finance low cost 
housing in South Africa. It was highlighted that in the South African housing 
finance market, mortgages can easily be accessed by the moderate and high 
income sector earning more than RB 000 per month. The very low income sector 
earning less than R3 500 have access to government housing subsidies. 
However, the low income sector earning below RB 000 per month cannot easily 
access housing finance. The banks are reluctant to lend to the low income 
earners because of the perceived risks associated with lending to this group. 
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Section 26 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) provides that housing is a 
basic human right and that the government must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right. Accordingly, the government has formulated and 
implemented a housing policy which has seen it delivering more than a million 
houses since 1994. The South African government housing policy was discussed 
in chapter four. The government established a number of housing institutions, 
entered into agreements with the banking sector, passed legislation and provided 
in excess of R29 billion subsidies to-date to housing beneficiaries. Despite these 
measures, housing backlogs and particularly low income housing finance 
remains a challenge. 
Motivations for applying securitisation to low income housing in South Africa 
were advanced in chapter four. These included the unresolved issue of housing 
backlogs, inadequate housing finance for low income earners, lessons learnt 
from the failure of Gateway, success factors of other securitisation initiatives in 
South Africa as well as the USA RMBS market and the sophisticated and sound 
financial system in South Africa . The chapter ended with a proposal of how to 
effectively apply securitisation to low income housing in South Africa. 
The proposal of an effective securitisation structure aims at addressing the 
challenges in the primary mortgage market. The proposal is based on the USA 
securitisation model which uses the participation of government agencies Fannie 
Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac. The proposal is based on the following six 
recommendations : 
i. closing the gap in the primary mortgage market for low income earners; 
ii. advancing the criteria on mortgages to low income earners ; 
iii. the banking sector's participation in the primary mortgage market for low 
income earners; 
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iv. the establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV); 
v. the funding of the SPV; 
vi. the issuing of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) by the SPV. 
The first, second and third recommendations aim at addressing the challenges in 
the primary mortgage market for low income earners. The fourth and fifth 
recommendations aim at establishing an effective and efficient special purpose 
vehicle. The last recommendation aims at boosting the securitisation market in 
South Africa comparable to what happened in the USA. It is hoped that the 
proposal will assist the authorities in resolving this socio-economic issue. 
5.2. RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH 
One of the main reasons for the lack of end user finance in the low income sector 
is the perceived risk of defaults by borrowers. This perceived risk, if not 
addressed, puts the success of a securitisation initiative in the low income 
housing sector in jeopardy. It is proposed that further research be conducted on 
whether there is a case for mortgage insurance in the low income housing sector. 
The success of such an endeavour will provide confidence to investors to commit 
funds to low income housing. 
It is further recommended that the option of the rental sector be investigated to 
resolve the housing backlog. 
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